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Abstract 
The subject of risk in agricultural production is very pertinent and touches on various aspects 
such as investments, food security, income levels of farmers, and market stability. Unmanaged, 
risks can have profound impacts on the agricultural sector and at the same time severely hamper 
long-term economic growth and poverty reduction efforts. Furthermore, risk management by 
farm households are multifarious with each having different cost and benefit implications. 
Using empirical data from a nationally representative farm household survey in Senegal, we 
evaluated the effect of different risk management strategies employed by farm households on 
agriculture income and dispersions around incomes. We achieve this by employing a 
Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression model and a Moment-Based Approach. We 
find mix results of the impact of risk management on agriculture incomes. The use of risk 
mitigation and transfer significantly reduces agriculture incomes while risk coping strategies 
significantly increases agriculture incomes. Risk mitigation strategies were observed to be 
associated with opportunity costs relating to income loss and likely inefficient resource 
allocations. On the contrary, the reduced agricultural incomes observed with the use of risk 
transfer might be related moral hazard problems such that insurance policy holders do not take 
care or expend less effort in their production activities. We also find that risk management 
strategies significantly reduce dispersions around agriculture incomes with risk transfer 
producing the largest effect. Furthermore, the effect of risk transfer strategies on dispersions 
around agriculture incomes is reduced when combine with other strategies. For the other risk 
management strategies, we find that when used in combinations, the dispersion reduction effect 
is greatly enhanced. 
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Introduction 
As pervasive and permanent fixtures of agricultural landscapes, risks are costly and if 
unchecked breeds uncertainty, stifle agricultural investments (D’Alessandro et al., 2015) and 
impose ex ante barriers to the use of technologies, which in turn affect agricultural productivity 
and economic growth (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; Barnett et al., 2008; Miller, 2008; Di 
Falco and Chavas, 2009; Kouamé, 2010; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Demeke et al., 2016; 
Poole, 2017; Amare et al., 2018). Agricultural price risks increases food prices and reduce the 
accessibility of food and this has a substantial impact on household nutrition, health, survival 
and resource management (D’Alessandro et al., 2015; Demeke et al., 2016). The incidence of 
risks also has important spill-over effects on other rural households and businesses (Anderson, 
2001). For instance, destroyed crops and livestock reduce employment opportunities, with 
serious implications for the landless rural poor in developing countries. By lowering farm 
outputs, risks can also reduce turnover for agricultural merchants and agro-processors (Pannell 
and Nordblom, 1998). 
Agricultural risks are also the principal cause of transient food insecurity and disruption to 
agricultural supply chains (World Bank, 2016). At the same time, risks faced by farmers are 
many, specific and vary in terms of climate, agricultural system of production and country 
(Anderson, 2001; Jaffee et al., 2010). Yield volatility and price volatility are by far the two 
most important risk faced by farmers which are projected to rise due to climate change. 
Additionally, agricultural risks potentially limits access to finance, increases the likelihood of 
farmers defaulting on loans and this restrains agriculture productivity (Yaron et al., 1997; 
Demeke et al., 2016). Particularly in developing regions of the world, smallholder producers 
are often exposed to a variety of biological and climatic risk factors that can negatively affect 
household income, wealth, as well as tremendous variability in output and input prices.  
As a leading sector in the economy of Senegal, agriculture is highly vulnerable to natural 
disasters and to the effects of climate change. In Senegal, agriculture is predominantly rain-
fed, with more than 95% of the total cropped area depending on rain-fed systems, and most 
farmers practicing subsistence agriculture (Khouma et al., 2013). Like most countries in the 
Sahel region, Senegal’s agricultural sector faces highly variable rainfall and is highly 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Furthermore, climate in Senegal is particularly 
characterized by high temperatures and low, highly variable annual precipitation with 
numerous observations indicating that risks associated with agricultural activity will grow in 
terms of diversity, size and frequency. Based on an analysis of available quantitative and 
qualitative data, D’Alessandro et al., (2015) identified drought, locusts, price volatility, crop 
pest and diseases as the most important risks facing Senegal’s agricultural sector. Specifically, 
weather related factors that relates to moisture stress caused either by erratic rainfall, early 
cessation of rains, delayed onset of rains, or extended drought are particularly prominent. 
Despite these identified risk events occurring in isolation, multiple and overlapping shocks are 
observed to have far greater impacts and higher associated losses (D’Alessandro et al., 2015). 
In fact more than 40% of the variation in crop yields in Senegal can be ascribed to the variation 
in annual rainfall amounts (D’Alessandro et al., 2015). Furthermore, a macro level analysis 
and estimates of the indicative value of losses, due to agricultural risks for 11 major crops 
between the period of 1980 to 2012 by D’Alessandro et al., (2015) shows that total losses from 
production risks in Senegal amounted to 4.82 million MT. In monetary equivalent, this is about 
US$1.38 billion, or about US$41.7 million per year, corresponding to about 3.9% of 
agricultural GDP on an average annual basis. The analysis further showed that the highest crop 
losses coincided with major shocks to agricultural production. D’Alessandro et al., (2015) 
further observed that although the average annual impact of shocks on GDP is relatively 
modest, actual impacts when they occur potentially results in losses of the order of 10 to 20% 
of the agricultural sector GDP. Further analysis also shows that Senegalese agriculture is 
subjected to losses exceeding 10% of gross production value in one out of every five or six 
years on average due to unmanaged risks. The most significant cause of loss in Senegal is due 
to drought/erratic rainfall, and this accounts for approximately 50% of crop yield reductions, 
followed by pests and diseases, especially locusts, which accounts for about 25% of crop yield 
losses. In addition maize production exhibits the highest level of vulnerability in terms of 
frequency of risk, whereas groundnuts production incurs the highest losses, accounting for 
nearly 45% of aggregate losses (D’Alessandro et al., 2015). 
Adverse weather patterns, in addition to limiting the ability and motivation of farm households 
to invest in agricultural technology and wealth-increasing assets, are particularly detrimental 
to farm households’ yields and outputs and this result in significant income losses and negative 
impacts on farmers’ livelihoods, consumption and food security (Demeke et al., 2016; Obiri 
and Driver, 2017). In Senegal D’Alessandro et al., (2015) argues that a major limiting factor 
to the adoption of productivity enhancing technologies is due to the widespread reluctance 
among the millions of smallholder farmers to assume risks associated with increased 
productivity. With only a limited capacity to manage production related risks, highly 
vulnerable farmers choose to limit their exposure by limiting their investment outlays. This is 
particularly the case because once farm households have invested a bulk of the required 
resources into production, there is effectively no way back when risks to production occur. 
Therefore, farm households in their risk aversion strategy will choose the planting of low-
investment, reward, and risk planting combinations (Hao, 2010) for example, thereby reducing 
the possibility to increase investment. Furthermore, by causing fluctuations in income and 
consumption, risks usually imply relatively high levels of transient poverty (Kouamé, 2010). 
This observation has been observed to contributes to the poverty trap experienced by rural 
people in many developing countries (World Bank, 2001; World Bank, 2005b; Barnett et al., 
2008; Demeke et al., 2016; World Bank, 2016; Birthal and Hazrana, 2019). Failure of farm 
households to cope with income risk is not only reflected in household consumption 
fluctuations but also on nutrition, health and education and this contribute to inefficient and 
sub-optimal intra-household resource allocations (Anderson, 2001; Dercon, 2002). For 
example, in India Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) found that the loss in efficiency 
associated with risk mitigation was considerably higher among poorer farmers. Similarly, 
studies by Morduch (1995), and Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002) also find considerable 
efficiency losses associated with risk mitigation.  
If unmanaged, risks can have a profound impact on the agricultural sector performance and this 
can severely hamper long-term economic growth and poverty reduction efforts. Additionally, 
unmanaged risks could potentially result in a vicious sequence of shock–partial recovery–
shocks, which can undermine natural and capital resources and threaten the transition from 
subsistence to commercial agriculture (Cusmano, 2013; Demeke et al., 2016; World Bank, 
2016). Hence, mitigation of agricultural risk has been increasingly focused on reducing the 
exposure and increasing the resilience of production systems and livelihoods to adverse 
impacts (World Bank, 2016). Putting in place effective risk management measures can help 
mitigate adverse impacts on agricultural supply chains and the livelihoods they support. 
However, it is virtually impossible to address all risks at once. Thus, it is necessary to prioritize 
interventions based on which risks occur most frequently and which cause the greatest financial 
losses (D’Alessandro et al., 2015).  
With limited access to credit or insurance markets and resources, farm households most often 
have challenges managing the myriad risks they face. At the same time, social and institutional 
mechanisms for coping with risk exposure are typically quite limited in low-income countries, 
especially among the rural poor (World Bank, 2005a; Devereux and Guenther, 2007; Barnett 
et al., 2008). Hence farm households heavily rely on a range of traditional risk management 
strategies to avoid or minimize losses but these are mostly incomplete, suboptimal and mitigate 
only a small part of overall risk (Siegel and Alwang, 1999; Dercon, 2002; Alderman, 2008; 
Barnett et al., 2008; Deressa et al., 2010; Kouamé, 2010). Because risks faced by farmers are 
both numerous, complex and interconnected, they vary in their levels of frequency and severity, 
and have profound short-term and long-term impacts on both income and livelihoods and 
therefore a singular blueprint for risk management is not feasible. Hence many farm households 
combine the use of many different strategies and tools to manage agricultural risk. As a result, 
the risk management portfolio of farm households is complex in nature (Meraner and Finger, 
2017).  
Farm households have a number of options available to manage farm risk but broadly speaking, 
mitigation strategies employed by various farm household may include; accepting the risk, 
avoiding or eliminating the risk, transferring the risk to another party or controlling the risk. 
Farm households therefore use these risk management tools simultaneously or in combinations 
to deal with agricultural risks (Harwood et al., 1999; Makki et al., 2001; Flaten et al., 2005; 
Velandia et al., 2009; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Ullah et al., 2015; World Bank, 2016). In 
most cases they are assumed to select a combination of risk management strategies that, for 
example maximize expected net returns subject to the degree of risk they are willing to accept 
(Harwood et al., 1999; Tomek and Peterson, 2001). Empirical evidence suggest that risk 
management approaches in which multiple approaches are considered simultaneously, appears 
to be more efficient than single approaches (Huirne et al., 2007). Despite the existence of many 
risk-spreading strategies and tools available to farm households, these are not always widely 
available or prove ineffective for poor farm households and are also not without associated 
costs. In fact the empirical literature (see  Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Barnett et al., 2008; 
Kahan, 2008; Deressa et al., 2010; World Bank, 2016) tend to suggest that there is an implied 
risk cost to all risk management strategies employed by farm households. These implied risk 
cost or premium can either the explicit or the opportunity cost of undertaking the strategy.  
At the same time several alternatives for mitigating risk have been reported in the empirical 
literature, yet most of these empirical studies have focused on the adoption of one or two 
management strategies at most (see  Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Gong et al., 2016; Saqib 
et al., 2016). But how effective1 are these risk management strategies farm households employ 
in managing risk, and how large are the benefits? The available empirical evidence is 
                                                          
1 The overall effectiveness of a risk management strategy typically requires the evaluation of trade-offs between expected returns and the associated costs (actual 
or opportunity costs). Effectiveness of a risk management strategy therefore calls for a balanced of costs against the achieved reduction or returns (dispersion 
around incomes). In this paper we only evaluate the effectiveness of risk management strategies from the returns perspective. Cost effectiveness is beyond the 
scope of this study. We use the associated standard deviation of households’ agriculture incomes as proxy indicators for the return’s effectiveness of a risk 
management strategies. 
inadequate to provide definitive answers. A few studies have evaluated the effectiveness or 
impact of some of these risk management strategies and tools on a case by case basis. For 
instance Birthal and Hazrana (2019) used a panel of district-level data from India to evaluate 
the effectiveness of crop diversification in mitigating harmful effects of climatic shocks on the 
performance of agriculture by estimating a dynamic generalized method of moments model 
with lags of dependent and independent variables as instruments. They found that crop 
diversification was an important ex ante adaptation measure to climatic shocks and they 
estimated the marginal effects of diversification under moderate and severe climatic shocks to 
be 1.73 and 2.19, respectively. They also observed that in the long-run, the marginal effects 
improve considerably to 4.96 under moderate shocks and to 6.35 under severe shocks. Howard 
and D’Antonio (1984) also used a theoretical mathematical optimization model investigate the 
hedging effectiveness of optimal holding of future contracts. They find that hedging 
effectiveness depends exclusively on the correlation between the returns of the spot and the 
futures and the risk-return relative. Kimura et al., (2010) shows that diversification as a risk 
management strategy is a very effective strategy to reduce revenue risk. They find that it lowers 
the coefficient of variation of revenue under 6 crop allocation by an average of 12% in 
Germany, 29% in the UK, 29% in Estonia, 35% in the Netherlands and 33% in Australia. 
Furthermore, Kimura et al., (2010) found that the marginal impact of price-hedging through 
forward contract on income variability increased the certainty equivalent of income by 1.3% 
and 2.2% in Australia and UK, respectively. 
Li and Vukina, (1996) finds that dual hedge in price and yield futures in the presence of price 
and yield risks reduces the variance of farm revenue by hedging in both markets rather than 
just using the price futures. Dhuyvetter and Kastens (1997) also used simulated revenue to 
examine the combinations of crop insurance alternatives (catastrophic insurance, multi-peril 
crop insurance, and crop revenue coverage) as they relate to expected income and income 
variability. They find that multi-peril crop insurance and crop revenue coverage resulted in the 
least income variability, measured by both standard deviation and minimum revenue. Heifner 
and Coble (1997) employed numerical integration to approximate crop revenue distributions 
when optimal futures and options hedges are coupled with or without crop insurance. They find 
that combinations of crop insurance and forward pricing are much more effective than either 
alone in reducing risks. Berg (2002) also investigated farm level impacts of multiple peril yield 
and revenue insurance in an expected value-variance framework using a stochastic simulation 
approach with numerical optimisation. He finds that multiple peril crop insurance significantly 
reduces the variability of income. In a most recent study, Vigani and Kathage (2019) used a 
multinomial endogenous switching regression model to estimate the impacts of different risk 
management strategies and portfolios under varying levels of risk on total factor productivity 
using survey data from French and Hungarian farms. They found that the impacts can be 
positive or negative, depending on the risk management strategies adopted, the structure of the 
farming system, and the probability of risks. Breen et al., (2013) have also used multi-criteria 
analysis approach to evaluate various risk management tools and polices. In their approach 
they summarized the strengths and weaknesses of various market and government risk 
management related tools and policies and then ranked them accordingly. The criteria upon 
which they evaluated the various risk management tools and policies included acceptability, 
effectiveness, operationality and cost. Despite being useful, their approach is subjective and 
not backed by any empirical evidence. 
Among the most fundamental and complex decisions that farm households have to make, is 
the choice among probability functions of income stemming from different risk management 
strategies. Hence an optimal risk management decisions of farm households often rely on sound 
analysis of the entire portfolio of policies available to them. Concurrently, the aim of 
agricultural risk management is to find risk-efficient combination of tools and instruments that 
reduces the variability of household farm incomes. Motivated by the solid and growing 
literature on risk management techniques, this paper seeks to answer the question; which 
optimal risk management strategies allow households to maximize their objectives in terms of 
expected income and variability of income? We are therefore interested in investigating how 
effective the various strategies and mechanisms employed by farm households to deal with risk 
are. More importantly we seek to explore their impacts in terms of stabilizing and reducing the 
variability or dispersions around agriculture incomes. We therefore attempt to determine the 
“best” tools, in terms of stabilizing farm households’ agriculture incomes by employing a 
multinomial endogenous switching regression that accounts for selectivity bias and a moment-
based approach to determine the impacts of the various risk management strategies on 
agriculture incomes and it’s dispersions in a multinomial framework. Although our paper is 
not the first to investigate the effectiveness of risk management strategies, to the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first to analyse the causal impact of various risk management typologies 
in a multinomial framework2. This approach is unique and interesting because it allows us to 
evaluate and compare risk management strategies across the different typologies. 
This study is also important for several reasons. First it highlights the need for a more targeted 
and systematic approach to agricultural risk management. Because good risk management 
decisions depend on accurate information, hence evaluating the effectiveness of different 
strategies and tools helps farm households to refine their decisions and select optimum set of 
strategies when faced with risky situations. This is particularly important because fluctuations 
in farm incomes, due to risks may present difficult welfare problems for farmers. Optimal risk 
management tools also have implications for rural growth and poverty reduction. Furthermore, 
since both national governments and donor organizations face budget constraints and 
opportunity costs related to using scarce resources to develop risk management programs, 
identifying optimal risk management strategies provides useful information for the design of 
appropriate risk management policies by policymakers. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 formally presents relevant works on risk management in the empirical 
literature. In Section 3, the conceptual framework, econometric specification, and the survey 
and data used is described. In Section 4, we present the empirical results and discussions and 
finally, Section 5 offers conclusion and policy implications. 
 
 
                                                          
2 A few studies have also used the multinomial endogenous switching regression (MESR) model to study the impact of some risk adaptation strategies. In a recent 
study, Vigani and Kathage (2019) employed the MESR model to estimate the impacts of different risk management strategies and portfolios under varying levels 
of risk on total factor productivity using panel data from French and Hungarian farms. Kassie et al., (2015) used the MESR model together with a moment-based 
approach just like this current study to investigate the impact of sustainable intensification practices (crop diversification and minimum tillage) on farm households’ 
food security, downside risk and the cost of risk in Malawi. Di Falco and Veronesi (2013) have also used multinomial endogenous switching regression model to 
analyze the impact of different adaptation strategies on crop net revenues in the Nile Basin of Ethiopia. Their focus was on agronomic practices such as soil 
conservation, changing crop varieties, water strategies and various other strategies. 
2.0 Literature review 
A large number of literature exists on the subject of risk and risk management in agriculture 
with variations in the understanding and use of the terminology. In the context of this study, 
agriculture risks are seen as shocks (e.g. climatic shocks – drought, erratic rainfall, flooding; 
biological shocks – pest and disease outbreaks; and price volatility for inputs and outputs) 
experienced by farm households. There are three important channels through which these 
shocks impact farm households; first they influence households' decisions to adopt 
productivity-enhancing inputs and impose ex ante barriers to their use (Di Falco and Chavas, 
2009; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Amare et al., 2018). Secondly, they reinforce changes 
in production portfolio towards farm enterprises that are less-vulnerable to shocks, but at the 
same time may also be less remunerative compared to others (Birthal and Hazrana, 2019). 
Thirdly, they cause potential deviation between expected and real outcomes (Schaffnit-
Chatterjee, 2010; Obiri and Driver, 2017). While this deviation may either be positive or 
negative, a negative outcome has greater importance from a practical point of view. Several 
research (see Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Harwood et al., 1999; Fafchamps, 2000; Poole, 
2017) have shown that farm households are not particularly concerned with uncertainty relating 
to agricultural output and prices, but rather to variability of their incomes. This is because 
economic well-being is affected not only by the level of income but also its fluctuations. Hence 
from the perspective of farm households, risk can reduce welfare in several important ways. 
Risk management involves choosing among alternatives to reduce the effects of risk and this 
typically requires the evaluation of trade-offs between changes in risk, expected returns, and 
other variables (Harwood et al., 1999). Because risks in agriculture is a continuum, different 
instruments (risk management strategies and tools) are best suited to address different these 
risks. The empirical literature describes risk management based on different taxonomies or 
typologies. These include; risk mitigation/reduction, risk transfer, and risk coping (Walker and 
Jodha, 1986; Singla and Sagar, 2012; Barnett et al., 2008; D’Alessandro et al., 2015; Demeke 
et al., 2016; World Bank, 2016; Edema et al., 2017; Gessesse and Zerihun, 2017). Reduction, 
mitigation and coping (Siegel and Alwang, 1999; Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2001; OECD, 
2009). Risk reduction strategies are those meant to reduce or minimize the likelihood of the 
occurrence of an uncertain event which would negatively affect welfare. Risk mitigation 
strategies on the other hand do not only moderate the likelihood of risk occurrence but also 
offsets any welfare losses following realization of the event. Such strategies are therefore taken 
prior to the realization of a risky event to lower the probability of a risky event.  
Strategies under this typology have been found to be particularly useful for risks that occur 
with relatively high frequency but with lower impact intensity. Risk transfer strategies 
encompasses tools or mechanisms that transfer the potential financial consequences of 
particular risks from one party to a willing third party, usually for a fee or premium. Such 
transfer strategies are useful for risks that occur with relatively low frequency but with medium 
loss probabilities. Risk coping strategies involves tools to deal with an event once it has 
occurred. They seek to help farm households to better absorb and recover from the impacts of 
a risk and are appropriate for very low frequency but with very high loss probabilities. Risk 
management could also be based on sources of risk in farming such as production, marketing, 
financial, institutional, and human and personal risk management tools (Baquet et al., 1997; 
Musser and Patrick, 2002; Kahan, 2008; Aditto et al., 2012; Crane et al., 2013; Obiri and 
Driver, 2017).  
Furthermore, risk management can be based on a matrix of informal, formal, ex ante and ex 
post risk management strategies (World Bank, 2001b; Lilleor et al., 2005; World Bank, 2005b) 
or Ex ante tools and ex post tools (Chetaille et al., 2011). Here, informal strategies are those 
practiced at the micro or farm level by farmers, whereas formal strategies are institutional and 
driven by national governments. Ex ante or ex post typology focuses on the point at which the 
reaction to risk takes place. In particular, ex ante strategies are those taken before the realization 
of a risky event to lower the probability of a risky event. In the nutshell, ex ante measures are 
synonymous with the risk reduction/mitigation and transfer strategies described earlier and are 
used when there is an anticipation of variation farm income. Ex post strategies are those taken 
after a risk event has occurred and are synonymous to risk coping strategies. They are used in 
response to the variation of farm income. Another risk management typology described in the 
empirical literature is risk prevention and treatment (Chetaille et al., 2011). Here risk 
prevention strategies are meant to either reduce the probability of loss or to reduce the impact 
of the loss (or both). Because prevention strategies are not enough or applicable in every case, 
risk treatment strategies are meant to limit the negative impacts of risk on income and there are 
three subcategories of risk treatment which are; assumption, transfer and safety nets.  
Miller et al., (2004) also classifies risk management strategies into avoidance, reduction, 
assumption/ retention and transfer. Risk avoidance as a strategy involves structuring farm 
enterprises so that certain types of risk are non-existent. Risk assumption/retention strategies 
are basically employed because not all risks are transferable hence risk assumption/retention 
involves retaining or accepting risks with the objective that assuming such increased risk helps 
to maintain control and/or enhance overall profitability. Alderman and Paxson (1994) have also 
classified risk management into risk management strategies and risk coping strategies. Where 
risk management strategies involve actions to reduce the variability of income.  
For the sake of brevity, risk management actions can be implemented at both the micro and 
macro-level. Micro-level actions are undertaken by farm households, with the goal of risk 
management decisions to protect assets and improve resiliency and these actions are the focus 
of the current study. On the other hand, macro-level actions are those implemented at a national 
level with various risk management strategies being incorporated into sectorial growth and 
investment and policy decisions. Farm households employ different risk management 
strategies and tools under the various typologies described earlier and the literature documents 
a vast number of these strategies used to offset the adverse effects of risk and income shortfalls. 
Some of these include choosing to produce lower risk outputs (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 
1993; Bardhan et al., 2000; Dercon, 2005; Carter and Barrett, 2006; Barnett et al., 2008; Kahan, 
2008), employing risk reducing inputs or technologies (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2001; World 
Bank, 2005b; Barnett et al., 2008; Kahan, 2008; Schaffnit-Chatterjee, 2010; Chetaille et al., 
2011; Breen et al., 2013; Obiri and Driver, 2017), informal risk-sharing arrangements such as 
share tenancy contracts, traditional money-lending, and risk sharing within extended family 
and other community networks (Zeuli, 1999; Anderson, 2001; Barnett et al., 2008; Kahan, 
2008), and diversifying income sources through multiple farm enterprises or off-farm activities 
(Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Harwood et al., 1999; Adger et al., 2003; Benin et al., 2004; 
Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; Kijima et al., 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2006; Barnett et al., 2008; Di 
Falco and Chavas, 2009; Deressa et al., 2010; Di Falco et al., 2010; Tangermann, 2011; 
Bezabih and Sarr, 2012; Bezabih and Di Falco, 2012; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Obiri and 
Driver, 2017; Birthal and Hazrana, 2019). Others include formal insurance such as index-based 
insurance products (Wang et al., 1998; Martin et al., 2001; Turvey, 2001; Vedenov and Barnett, 
2004; Barnett et al., 2005; World Bank, 2005a,b; Deng et al., 2007a,b; Huirne et al., 2007; 
Barnett et al., 2008; Kahan, 2008; Velandia et al., 2009; Enjolras et al., 2012; D’Alessandro et 
al., 2015; Wang et al., 2016; World Bank, 2016; Obiri and Driver, 2017; Poole, 2017), informal 
insurance such as dependence on relatives and neighbours for material and moral support 
(World Bank, 2005a,b, 2016), agronomic practices such as conservation farming practices, 
mulching, sustainable land management etc. (World Bank, 2016; Baiyeri and Aba, 2017; Obiri 
and Driver, 2017), production and market (sales) contracts (Makus et al., 1990; Harwood et 
al., 1999; World Bank, 2005b; Kahan, 2008; Breen et al., 2013), and household coping 
strategies such as labour market participation, reduced consumption, sales of assets etc. 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Fafchamps, 1999; Dixon et al., 2001; Skees et al., 2002; Belay 
et al., 2005; Devereux and Guenther, 2007; Kahan, 2008; Deressa et al., 2010; Demeke et al., 
2016; World Bank, 2016).  
Even though the strategies outlined above are very important for risk and vulnerability 
reduction, there is an implied risk premium or cost for all of these risk management strategies 
which can be very high (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Morduch, 1995; Zimmerman and 
Carter, 2003; Deressa et al., 2010; World Bank, 2016). For instance, the implied risk premium 
for self-insurance strategies employed by farm households such as diversification, producing 
lower risk outputs, or employing risk reducing inputs or technologies is either the explicit or 
the opportunity cost of undertaking the strategy. According to Kahan (2008), the cost could be 
expressed by the amount of resources tied up in order for a farm household to manage their 
risks more effectively. Such implied costs are easy to identify in some instances, while in 
others, the cost is less recognisable. At the same time, some of these risk management strategies 
can potentially generate adverse external effects. Dercon (1996), Skees et al., (2002) and 
Barrett and Swallow (2006) for instance observed pecuniary externalities in the case of distress 
asset sales following covariate shocks. For example, mass selling of livestock during a major 
shock such as drought can drive livestock prices down in situations where covariate risks have 
impacts across large regions, hence bringing no increase income gains for households. 
Furthermore, some authors (see Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Zimmerman and Carter, 
2003) also tend to suggest the occurrence of such impacts even in the case of localized adverse 
shocks if markets for the asset are not spatially integrated. As pointed out earlier, traditional or 
household-level risk-management strategies are mostly ineffective (Skees et al., 2002; World 
Bank, 2005a) because they only achieve partial risk coverage at a very high cost and are in 
some cases localized and limited in scope. In addition, informal risk transfer measures such as 
socially constructed reciprocity obligations within various social networks, semi-formal 
microfinance, rotating savings and credit marginalize the most vulnerable and have high hidden 
costs (World Bank, 2001a,b, 2005a,b). Empirical evidence (see Platteau, 1997; Jalan and 
Ravallion, 1999; Santos and Barrett, 2006) also suggest that access to these informal risk 
transfer measures are positively related to social factors such as existing wealth, meaning this 
can prevent reciprocity obligations and hence the poorest of the poor have little to gain from 
such arrangements. At the same time, such arrangements are fragile, inequitable and untimely 
and can leave individuals exposed to risk while at the same time creating a dependency that 
has dire consequences (Carter, 1997; World Bank, 2005a). Since covariate agriculture shocks 
often affect entire regions, local mutual insurance schemes can break-down (Hazell, 1992; 
Dercon, 1996, 2002; Anderson, 2001; Skees et al., 2002; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; 
Townsend, 1994; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003).  
Also, some empirical studies (see Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Morduch, 1995; 
Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002) have found considerable efficiency losses associated with risk 
mitigation, typically due to lack of specialization due to the need for farmers to make trade-
offs between income variability and profitability. Skees et al., (2002) also observed that ex post 
risk management strategies involving coping measures such as reduced consumption and sales 
of assets are costly. Some authors (see Bhandari et al., 2007; Barnett et al., 2008; Amare et al., 
2018) suggest that farm households that use risk coping mechanisms are unable to recover the 
loss of assets ex post the shock. Hence, liquidating productive assets may also not be a viable 
risk management option for the poorest of the poor (Barnett et al., 2008) with empirical 
evidence (see Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Kazianga and Udry, 2006) suggesting that 
extremely poor households recognize the danger of such sales of assets and thus choose to 
waive consumption (e.g. reduced expenditures on school fees, health care, and food 
consumption) rather than further liquidating assets. This can reduce in the nutshell the value of 
human assets, further presenting not only a barrier to poverty alleviation, but also reinforces 
poverty (Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001; Dercon and Hoddinott, 2003; Thomas et al., 2004; 
Hoddinott, 2006; Kouamé, 2010). The World Bank (2005b) also observed that the need of 
households to smooth consumption against idiosyncratic and correlated shocks which they do 
through coping strategies, comes at a serious cost in terms of production efficiency and reduced 
profits, thus lowering the overall level of household consumption. 
Diversification as a risk management strategy can hinder development since gains are possible 
when households specialize (Skees et al., 2002). Furthermore, diversification may not actually 
spread certain types of risk, in particular, weather events that cause widespread losses. 
Implying that when covariate risks occurs, it may impact a variety of sources of income such 
own farm, agricultural labour, and non-farm income hence diversification may not necessarily 
be an effective strategy (Skees et al., 2002). Furthermore, diversification could imply farmers 
shift the share of land use under high value crops such as cash and permanent crops and this 
reallocation can have a detrimental effect on agriculture income. Furthermore, diversification 
can lower the yields of cash crops relative to staple crops, and potentially increase the level of 
staple crops planted. This is because farmers devote a larger share of land to safer, traditional 
varieties or staple crops than to riskier high-yielding varieties or value crops (Morduch, 1995; 
Salazar-Espinoza et al., 2015). In the nutshell farmers tend to use resources sub-optimally 
leading to less productivity on average than other strategies that farmers could have followed 
if risk could be ignored for instance (Anderson, 2001). Other studies (see Purdy et al., 1997; 
Barry et al., 2001; Poon and Weersink, 2011) have also shown that farm enterprise diversity 
does not always lower farm income volatility, suggesting that encouraging a wider mix of 
enterprises is not always an effective strategy to reduce fluctuations in farm income. In a study 
of the effects of multiple enterprises on reducing risk for Saskatchewan farmers, Schoney et 
al., (1994) observed that slight risk reduction was obtained by diversifying beyond two or three 
crop portfolios. In addition, the aforementioned authors observed that, despite several crops 
typically having a risk-reducing effect on the portfolio, these benefits were typically offset by 
the lower gross incomes linked with such levels of diversification. 
Index-based insurance products in agriculture serves two main purposes, reducing vulnerability 
by compensating producers for the economic losses suffered from insured events and 
increasing productivity through increased investment by securing credit in case of loan default 
due to insurable events (Barnett et al., 2008; Kouamé, 2010; D’Alessandro et al., 2015). 
However, despite index-based insurance products being a powerful ex ante instrument to 
address risk before it materializes, one significant limitation is the existence of basis risk 
(Miranda and Vedenov, 2001; World Bank, 2005b; Barnett et al., 2008; Hazell et al., 2010; 
Jensen and Barrett, 2017; Jensen et al., 2018). With basis risk, it is possible for a farm 
household to experience a loss and yet not receive a payment. Concurrently, it is also possible 
that the household will not experience a loss and yet receive a payment. Basis risk occurs 
because the index upon which the insurance is developed is not perfectly correlated with farm-
level losses (Barnett et al., 2008). The effectiveness of index-based insurance as a risk 
management tool is therefore dependent on how positively farm-level losses are correlated with 
the underlying index (World Bank, 2005b). 
In using a field experiment in Mali, Elabed and Carter (2015) show that behavioural factors 
related to basis risk affected insurance demand and showed that farmers disliked the uncertainty 
of insurance payments with this behavioural reaction generating a drop-in insurance demand 
from approximately 60% to 35% when compound-risk aversion (the aversion to original 
uncertainty of shocks and uncertainty of insurance payments or basis risk) was taken into 
consideration. Similarly, studies by Jensen et al., (2018) and Clarke (2016) shows that basis 
risk deter insurance purchase. Even though several studies (see Wang et al., 1998; Black et al., 
1999; Martin et al., 2001; Turvey, 2001; Vedenov and Barnett, 2004; Barnett et al., 2005; Deng 
et al., 2007) having empirically examined the effectiveness of index-based insurance products 
with mixed results, Barnett et al., (2008) argues that they can be highly effective risk 
management tool if basis risk is relatively small and ineffective if basis risk is large. 
Furthermore, agricultural insurance is often characterized by high administrative costs, due, in 
part, to the risk classification and monitoring, data acquisition needed to establish accurate 
premium rates and conducting claims adjustments (World Bank, 2005b). Some studies have 
also found contradictory impacts of insurance.  
For example, Giné and Yang (2009) finds index insurance contracts to significantly reduce 
investment in a new agricultural opportunity. De Nicola (2015) finds that in cases where single, 
low-technology options are available, insurance tends to reduce total input investments, and it 
weakens farmers' precautionary motives to overinvest. Farrin and Murray (2014) reports of a 
negative effect of insurance on wealth, as in good years farmers pay a premium but do not 
receive an indemnity payment. Giné et al., (2010) also observed that index-insurance products 
could only improve welfare if other risk-sharing mechanisms employed by households are 
insufficient. Dercon et al., (2014) argues that index-insurance is particularly beneficial to 
groups that are able to hedge idiosyncratic risks in an informal manner. Some insurance 
schemes have also been observed to reduce the use of production diversification, or reduces 
and even eliminate the demand for other formal risk hedging/transfer products (Schaffnit-
Chatterjee, 2010). Supplementary to risk management strategies employed by farm 
households, public risk-management strategies targeting farm households also have limitation 
in terms of coverage, weak institutional linkages among stakeholders who deal with risk 
management, poor early warning mechanisms, and dependence on foreign sources (World 
Bank, 2005a; Devereux and Guenther, 2007). 
 
3.0 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework used in this study is based on farm households’ decisions to adopt 
risk management strategies that help them to offset the adverse effects of risk and income 
shortfalls. At the farm household level, risk management strategies are basically aimed at 
enhancing expected return while reducing volatility. Following Kim and Chavas (2003); 
Koundouri et al., (2006) and Mukasa (2018) we model farm households’ choice of agricultural 
risk management tools in an expected utility framework. Just like farm households having to 
make production decisions before climatic and other risks are realized, the adoption of risk 
management strategies follows a situation where farm households are uncertain about the 
outcome of their decisions. Therefore, the adoption of risk management strategies is related to 
uncertain prospect, which one can reduce to a probability distribution over a domain of possible 
payoffs. Hence, decision-making by farm households therefore boils down to a choice between 
different possible probability distributions of returns, herein agricultural incomes. 
We therefore assume that each risk management strategies are associated with certain 
probability distribution of agriculture incomes which is directly unknown to the farm 
households. Farm households are confronted with a situation where they must choose from 
among a set of risk management strategies that maximizes their subjective expected returns. 
Households select from a finite set of risk management strategies (mitigation, transfer, and 
coping) to maximize3 the impact of risk management strategy on their income. More 
importantly as shown in figure 1, adoption of the various risk management practices is 
associated with different effects, herein dispersions around the means of agriculture income. 
From figure 1a, if we assume that agriculture incomes follow a normal distribution and π is the 
mean or average household agriculture income, then an adopted risk management strategy can; 
a) reduce the dispersion or variation around π (i.e. the areas between τ1 and τ2) or b) increase 
the dispersion or variation around π (i.e. the areas between φ1 and φ2). In the same fashion, risk 
management strategies could have different effects on the skewness distribution of household 
incomes (figure 1b). It could lead to a) negative skewness distribution (i.e. φ1) or b) positive 
skewness distribution (i.e. φ2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Dispersion effect of risk management strategies on incomes 
                                                          
3 In this context we assume farm households select risk instruments that maximizes agriculture incomes but minimizes dispersions around of incomes. 
b) Skewness effects a) Variance effects 
π  τ1  τ2  φ2  φ1 
Agriculture income 
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
 i
n
co
m
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 
π φ2 φ1 
Agriculture income 
A
g
r
ic
u
lt
u
re
 i
n
co
m
e
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 
Furthermore, adoption decisions on these risk management strategies are made without 
knowing which outcomes may result from such decisions, hence farm household decision 
making occurs under uncertainty. The risk management strategies in this finite set are also 
mutually exclusive, therefore the choice of one implies rejection of the others. We assume that 
a farm household decisions are based on whether or not to adopt any, some, or all of the risk 
management strategies, j available to them (j = 1,...., M).  
In light of this, we assume that farm households will choose risk management strategies that 
will result in the highest expected utility. Households will maximize their expected utility 
E[u(k)] = ∫k f(k)u(k), where u(k) is a real-valued function representing the utility obtained from 
a risk management strategy k, and f(k) is the probability density function of k.  
 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
In a multiple risk management strategies adoption setting, farm households’ simultaneous use4 
of these strategies (risk mitigation, transfer, and coping) leads to eight5 (23) possible 
combinations (portfolio) of strategies that farm households could choose from (Table 1). 
Because of the simultaneous use of these strategies, failing to account for the fact that farm 
households can adopt several risk management strategies simultaneously, can lead to biased 
estimates as the overall effect of adoption is not necessarily equal to the sum of the effects of 
adopting each strategy separately (Wu and Babcock, 1998). Farm households’ decisions to 
adopt these combinations of strategies may not also be random and they may endogenously 
self-select into adoption or non-adoption. Therefore, decisions are likely to be influenced 
systematically both by observed and unobservable characteristics that may be correlated with 
the outcomes of interest herein agriculture income and standard deviation of agriculture 
income. Such unobservable characteristics may include for example the innate managerial and 
technical abilities of the farmers in understanding and using risk management strategies or the 
types of social networks formed by farmers that are not captured, such as the kind of neighbours 
the farmer communicates with and whether such neighbours have adopted the risk management 
strategy. Inability to therefore capture these unobservable characteristics may lead to selection 
bias.  
Table 1: Risk management portfolios available to farm households 
Risk Management Portfolio Portfolio ID 
Risk 
mitigation 
Risk 
transfer 
Risk 
coping 
Frequency 
(%) 
Base category - no strategy RMP0    5.38 
Risk mitigation RMP1 ✓   59.13 
Risk transfer RMP2  ✓  0.83 
Risk coping RMP3   ✓ 19.07 
Risk mitigation + transfer RMP4 ✓ ✓  1.56 
Risk mitigation + coping RMP5 ✓  ✓ 13.08 
Risk mitigation + transfer + coping RMP6 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0.24 
Risk transfer + coping RMP7  ✓ ✓ 0.70 
                                                          
4 Empirical evidence suggests that farm households use a combination or a portfolio of risk management strategies to deal with adverse effects of risk. These have 
already been discussed at length in the literature review section. We provide the individual strategies before the aggregation into the three risk management 
typologies in Appendix A1. 
5 Due to fewer observations risk management portfolio RMP6 was dropped. We observed 13 observations under this risk management portfolio. 
Hence, to disentangle the pure effects of adoption, we model the farm households’ choice of 
risk management portfolio and the impacts of adoption in a multinomial endogenous switching 
regression framework. This approach is a selection-bias correction methodology based on the 
multinomial logit selection model developed by Bourguignon et al., (2007). This approach 
allows us to firstly, obtain both consistent and efficient estimates of the selection process and 
a reasonable correction for the outcome equations, even with violations of the axiom of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Secondly, it allows us to evaluate both individual 
risk management strategies and combined strategies (portfolios), while capturing the 
interactions between the choices of alternative portfolios. Estimation of the multinomial 
endogenous switching regression occurs simultaneously in two steps. In the first stage, farm 
households’ choices of risk management portfolios are modelled using a multinomial logit 
selection model, while recognizing the inter-relationships among the portfolios. The respective 
parameters are also estimated and then used to calculate the selection-bias correction (or 
selectivity) terms.  
In the second stage, the selection-bias correction terms together with the probability of each 
risk management portfolio being chosen are incorporated into as covariates to estimate the 
impacts of portfolios on agriculture income and the standard deviation of agriculture incomes 
using ordinary least squares (OLS). Following the studies of Di Falco and Veronesi (2013); 
Kassie et al., (2015); Teklewold et al., (2017) and Vigani and Kathage (2019) we describe the 
empirical econometric approach used in the study below. 
 
Stage I: Multinomial Adoption Selection Model 
Farm households are assumed to maximize their expected revenues by using a portfolio of risk 
management strategies. Let Y*ij be the latent variable that captures the expected net revenues 
from the use of a risk management portfolio j (j=1……….M) with respect to implementing any 
other portfolio k. We specify the latent variable as 
𝑌𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝜛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗      [1] 
Equation [1] includes a deterministic component (Xiϖ), and an idiosyncratic unobserved 
stochastic component εij. The deterministic component is a latent variable determined by 
observed household characteristics such as age, gender, education of the household head, farm 
household size, asset ownership, plot, soil fertility and climatic characteristics (e.g. mean 
rainfall and temperature). While the unobserved stochastic component captures all the variables 
that are relevant to the farm household’s decision maker but are unknown to the researcher 
such as skills or motivation. The utility obtained by farm households from choosing among the 
risk management portfolios is not directly observable, but the adoption decision is observable. 
A farm household i will choose a risk management portfolio j if it provides expected returns 
greater than any other portfolio if: 
𝑌𝑖
{
 
 
 
 1 iff 𝑌𝑖1
∗ >
max(𝑌𝑖𝑘
∗ )
𝑘 ≠ 1
or 𝜀𝑖1 < 0,
⋮            ⋮                              ⋮                 
𝑀 iff 𝑌𝑖𝑀
∗ >
max(𝑌𝑖𝑘
∗ )
𝑘 ≠ 𝑀
or 𝜀𝑖𝑀 < 0,
for all k≠j.     [2] 
 
The formulation in equation [2] implies that the ith farm household will adopt a risk 
management portfolio j to maximize their expected benefit if it provides greater expected utility 
than any other risk management portfolio k≠j, i.e. if 𝜀𝑖𝑗 =
max(𝑌𝑖𝑘
∗ )
𝑘 ≠ 1
< 0. It is assumed that the 
covariate vector Xi in equation [1] is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic unobserved stochastic 
component εij, i.e. E(εij | Xi) = 0. Under the assumption that εij is identically and independently 
Gumbel distributed, the probability of the ith farm household with characteristics X choosing 
the jth risk management portfolio can therefore be specified by a multinomial logit model 
(McFadden, 1974) as:  
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃(𝜀𝑖𝑗 < 0|𝑋𝑖) =
exp(𝑋𝑖𝜛𝑗)
∑ exp(𝑋𝑖𝜛𝑘)
𝑀
𝑘=1
.     [3] 
The parameter estimates of the latent variable model can be estimated by maximum likelihood 
estimation. In our specification, the base category, non-adoption of any risk management 
portfolio (see Table 1), is denoted as j = 1. In the remaining portfolios (j = 2,….., 7), at least 
one portfolio is used by a farm household.  
 
Stage II: Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression Model 
In the second stage, we estimate a multinomial endogenous switching regression model to 
investigate the impact of each risk management portfolio on agriculture income and the 
standard deviation of agriculture incomes by applying the Bourguignon et al., (2007) selection 
bias correction model. Our model implies that farm households face a total of M regimes (one 
regime per risk management portfolio, where j = 1 is the reference category “base or non-
adapting category”). We assume that the vector of outcome variables is a linear function of 
explanatory variables. Hence, the stochastic function to evaluate agriculture income and the 
standard deviation of agriculture incomes implications of each risk management portfolio for 
each regime j is given as: 
Regime 1: 𝑄𝑖1 = 𝑍𝑖𝛽1 + 𝛼𝑖1𝑍𝑖1 + 𝜇𝑖1 if 𝐴𝑖 = 1     
⋮                                   ⋮                                   ,
Regime M: 𝑄𝑖𝑀 = 𝑍𝑖𝛽𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖𝑀𝑍𝑖𝑀 + 𝜇𝑖𝑀 if 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑀
                
[4a]
⋮
[4m]
 
where Qij is the outcome variable of farm household i in regime j, (j = 1, …. , M), and Zi 
represents a vector of inputs, and farm household head and household’s characteristics, asset 
ownership, soil fertility and climatic characteristics (e.g. mean rainfall and temperature) 
included in Xi. β and α represents the corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated. μij 
represents the unobserved stochastic component, which verifies E(μij | Zi, Xi) = 0 and V(μij | Zi, 
Xi) = σ2j. In addition, to overcome the possible correlation of farm-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity with observed covariates, we employed the approach of Mundlak (1978) and 
Wooldridge (2018) which has also been used by Di Falco (2014), Kassie et al., (2015),  
Teklewold et al., (2017) and Vigani and Kathage (2019)6. Controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, is particularly important to help address farm or plot-specific unobservables as 
they may contain useful missing information regarding land quality (Kassie et al., 2015) for 
instance. Concurrently, if farm households obtain private information about unobservable 
effects such as how good the soil is on the plot or some shocks, they will adjust their factor 
input decisions accordingly (Fafchamps, 1993; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Assunção and 
Braido, 2007). Hence, this approach allows us to exploit crop and farm household-level 
information to deal with the issue of farm household’s unobservable characteristics such as 
their skills (human capital). Furthermore, crop-level information can potentially control for 
farm specific effects.  We exploit crop-level information and include the mean of crop varying 
𝑍 explanatory variables, which include land holding, fertilizer quantity and seed quantity to 
deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. According to Teklewold et al., (2013), a Wald 
test of the null hypothesis that the vectors α are jointly equal to zero is required to indicate the 
relevance of crop-specific heterogeneity. 
For each sample observation, Qij is observed if and only if one among the M dependent regimes 
is observed. When estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, the outcomes of interest, 
agriculture income and the standard deviation of agriculture income equations [4a]–[4m] are 
estimated separately. However, if the error terms of equation [1], εij are correlated with the 
error terms μij of the outcome model [4a] – [4m], then the expected values of μij conditional on 
the sample selection are nonzero i.e., corr(εij, μij) ≠ 0, and the OLS estimates will be biased and 
inconsistent. To correct for the potential inconsistency, we employ the multinomial 
endogenous switching regression model by Bourguignon et al., (2007), which takes into 
account the correlation between the error terms εij from the multinomial logit model estimated 
in the first stage and the error terms from each outcome equation μij. Bourguignon et al., (2007) 
show that consistent estimates of β and α in the outcome equations [4a]–[4m] can be obtained 
by estimating the following selection bias-corrected agriculture income and the standard 
deviation of agriculture income equations: 
Regime 1: 𝑄𝑖1 = 𝑍𝑖𝛽1 + 𝛼𝑖1𝑍𝑖1 + 𝜎1𝜏𝑖1 + 𝑣𝑖1 if 𝐴𝑖 = 1                                        [5a]
⋮                       ⋮                                                            ,                                    ⋮ 
Regime M: 𝑄𝑖𝑀 = 𝑍𝑖𝛽𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖𝑀𝑍𝑖𝑀 + 𝜎𝑀𝜏𝑖𝑀 + 𝑣𝑖𝑀 if 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑀                               [5m]
 
where, 𝑣 is the error term with an expected value of zero, σ is the covariance between εij and 
μij, τ is the inverse Mills ratio computed from the estimated probabilities in equation [3] as 
follows: 
𝜏𝑖 = ∑ 𝜌𝑗
𝑗
𝑘≠𝑗 [
?̂?𝑘𝑖In(?̂?𝑘𝑖)
1−?̂?𝑘𝑖
+ In(?̂?𝑗𝑖)] ; 𝜌      
where ?̂? represents the probability that farm household i chooses risk management portfolio j 
as defined in equation [3], ρj is the correlation between εij and μij. The specification in equation 
                                                          
6 In most of these studies, plot-variant variables were used to control for unobserved heterogeneity but due to the lack of plot-level data we use an alternative 
approach by using crop and farm household-variant variables since household produce multiple crops and we have crop-level data. In addition, we include the 
mean of crop-variant production cost because in our data we observed some cost related to the use of lubricants, pesticides, electricity and fuel and not the physical 
quantities of these inputs. A Wald test of the joint significance of mean of crop-variant production cost and the other crop variant variables in our model was 
significant, hence giving a justification for the inclusion. 
[5a – 5m] implies that the number of selection correction (bias) terms in each equation is equal 
to the number of multinomial logit choices M. 
The specified model allows us to identify not only the direction of the bias related to the 
allocation of farm households in a specific portfolio, but also which choice among any two 
alternative portfolios these bias stems from. For example, a positive bias correction coefficient 
related to alternative j selection equation in the alternative k outcome (e.g. agriculture income) 
equation highlights higher agriculture incomes of farm households who chose alternative k 
compared to farm households taken at random, due to the allocation of farm households with 
worse unobserved skills out of alternative k into the alternative j. In the nutshell, for each 
portfolio-based outcome estimation, a negative (positive) selectivity coefficient related to any 
of the alternative portfolio indicates lower outcomes than those of randomly chosen farm 
households on account of the allocation of farm households with better (worse) unobserved 
characteristics out of the given portfolio and into the respective alternative risk management 
portfolio. 
 
Estimating the standard deviation of agriculture incomes 
Ideally in estimating dispersions around agriculture income, panel or longitudinal data will be 
the most appropriate to observe risk management strategies and dispersions around agriculture 
incomes over time. But since we only have cross sectional data for this study, we employ an 
alternative approach to observe dispersions around agriculture incomes. In line with previous 
studies (see Kim and Chavas, 2003; Koundouri et al., 2006; Di Falco et al., 2007; Di Falco and 
Chavas, 2009; and Kassie et al., 2015; Mukasa, 2018), the estimation strategy for the standard 
deviation of agriculture income consisted of computing moments of the income function. The 
moment-based approach has been widely used in the literature as an indicators of risk exposure. 
Furthermore, the central moment moments around the mean is widely considered as a proxy 
for downside risk or the probability of losses. According to Antle (1983), maximization of the 
expected utility of profit E[U(π)] is equal to the maximization of the relevant moments of the 
risk exposure (e) distribution conditional on inputs use. To proceed with the estimation process, 
we first estimated each regime net agriculture income function and then used the residuals to 
compute the simple moments (variance and skewness) for each farm household. The mean 
equation of agriculture income is estimated as follows: 
𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝐻𝑖𝜙1 + 𝛾𝑖1𝐻𝑖1 +Ψ𝑖1        [6] 
where 𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑗 is the mean agriculture income of farm household i in regime j, Hi is a vector of 
variables assumed to influence the mean agriculture income functions; 𝐻𝑖 is a vector of inputs 
used that may shift the farm production, these includes fertilizer, seed and labour use, land size, 
soil fertility etc.; and Ψ denotes error terms distributed with mean zero E(Ψij) = 0. ϕ and γ are 
vectors of parameters to be estimated and associated with H and 𝐻, respectively.  If we assume 
that the independent variables in equation [6] are exogenous, then we can consistently estimate 
equation [6] by using OLS7. The first moment of agriculture income is then estimated as 
follows:   
𝑓(𝐻𝑖 , 𝜙𝑖 , 𝛾𝑖, 𝐻𝑖) ≡ 𝐸 [𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝐻𝑖, 𝐻𝑖, 𝑒)]    [7] 
The higher moments of agriculture income can be written as follows:  
𝐸 [𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝐻𝑖, 𝐻𝑖 , 𝑒) − 𝑓(𝐻𝑖, 𝜙𝑖 , 𝛾𝑖, 𝐻𝑖)
𝑘|𝐻] = 𝑓𝑘(𝐻𝑖, 𝜙𝑖, 𝛾𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖𝑘) where 𝑘 =  1,2,3 [8] 
where k = 1 is the mean agriculture income functions, k = 2 and k = 3 are the second (variance) 
and third (skewness) central moments of agriculture income functions under each risk 
management portfolio respectively. The standard deviation8 of agriculture incomes is then 
estimated as the squared root of second central moment (variance) of agriculture incomes. We 
then use the estimated standard deviation of agriculture income functions as dependent 
variables in equations [5a] – [5m] to estimate the impact of the adoption of each risk 
management portfolio on dispersions around agriculture income.  
While the variables Xi in equation [1] and Zi in equation [5a] – [5m] are allowed to overlap, 
proper identification requires at least one variable (instrument) in Xi that does not appear in Zi. 
However, finding true instruments in empirical work is sometimes challenging, or even 
impossible (Kassie et al., 2015; Ng’ombe et al., 2017). Therefore, the selection equation [1] is 
estimated based on all explanatory variables specified in the outcome equations plus at least 
one or more instruments. Following Di Falco and Veronesi (2013), we establish the 
admissibility of the selected instruments by performing a simple falsification test: the selected 
or valid instrument (s) is required to significantly influence a farm household’s choice of risk 
management portfolio but have no significant effect on outcomes (i.e. agriculture income and 
standard deviation of agriculture incomes). We also followed Stock et al., (2002) and examined 
the strength of the instruments based on the F-statistic. In this study, we employ membership 
of a farmer-based organization9, insurance needs and knowledge as identifying instruments. As 
shown by Antle (1983) the error terms in equations [5a] – [5m] are likely to exhibit 
heteroscedasticity, hence following Bourguignon et al., (2007), we bootstrapped the standard 
errors to deal with heteroscedasticity in the second stage. 
 
Estimation of the treatment and counterfactual effects 
The adoption of risk management strategies by farm households could result in positive welfare 
outcomes for households. However, estimating such outcomes in observational studies such as 
this one is important because of the difficulty of observing the counterfactual outcomes. In 
cases where experimental data are involved or available through randomized control trials for 
instance, information on the counterfactual situation would normally be provided, and as such, 
the problem of causal inference can easily be resolved (Miguel and Kremer, 2004). The 
challenge of impact evaluation using observational data is to estimate the counterfactual 
                                                          
7 We employed four different specification; linear, log-linear, linear-log and quadratic for the mean agriculture income equation. By observing the AIC and BIC 
with each specification, we settled for the log-linear specification because it produced the smallest values for AIC and BIC. 
8 It must be noted that the standard deviation estimated here are nothing other than the residual standard deviation. Most of the literature have used variance, 
skewness and kurtosis extensively, however this does not meet the interest of our paper, hence we transformed the second central moment (variance) into standard 
deviations. This is more advantageous because standard deviation is expressed in the same units as agriculture, hence making it more intuitive and informative. 
9 Vigani and Kathage (2019) in their study used membership of a farmer’s union as instrument. 
outcome, which is the outcome of interest when farm households that adopted a particular risk 
management portfolio could have gained had they not adopted that portfolio. Di Falco (2014), 
argues that in the absence of a self-selection problem, it would be appropriate to assign to farm 
households that adopted a counterfactual outcome of interest equal to the average outcome of 
interest of non-adopters with the same observable characteristics. However, unobserved 
heterogeneity in the propensity to choose a risk management portfolio also affects the outcome 
of interest and creates a selection bias in the outcome of interest equation (i.e. [5a] – [5m]) that 
cannot be ignored. The Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression framework however 
can be used to examine average treatment effects (ATT) by comparing expected outcomes of 
adopters with and without adoption. Following Bourguignon et al., (2007), we first derive the 
conditional expected outcome of interest (agriculture income and standard deviation of 
agriculture income) of farm households that adopted, which in our study means j = 2……..M 
(j = 1 is the reference category “non-adoption”) from equation [5a] – [5m], as 
𝐸(𝑄𝑖2|𝐴𝑖 = 2) = 𝑍𝑖2𝛽2 + 𝛼𝑖2𝑍𝑖2 + 𝜎2𝜏𝑖2                     [9a]
⋮ .                   ⋮
𝐸(𝑄𝑖𝑀|𝐴𝑖 = 𝑀) = 𝑍𝑖𝑀𝛽𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖𝑀𝑍𝑖𝑀 + 𝜎𝑀𝜏𝑖𝑀                    [9m]
 
Then, we obtain the expected outcome of interest of farm households that adopted risk 
management portfolio j in the counterfactual hypothetical case that they did not adopt (j = 1) 
as 
𝐸(𝑄𝑖1|𝐴𝑖 = 2) = 𝑍𝑖2𝛽1 + 𝛼1𝑍𝑖2 + 𝜎𝑖1𝜏𝑖2 [10a]
                                                             ⋮                                                                  .   ⋮
𝐸(𝑄𝑖1|𝐴𝑖 = 𝑀) = 𝑍𝑖𝑀𝛽𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖𝑀𝑍𝑖𝑀 + 𝜎𝑖𝑀𝜏𝑖1 [10m]
 
 
Equations [9a] – [9m] represent the actual expected outcomes of interest (agriculture income 
and standard deviation of agriculture income) actually observed in the sample for adopting 
farm households, while equations [10a] – [10m] are their respective counterfactual expected 
outcomes of interest. The use of these conditional expectations allows us to calculate the 
average treatment effects (ATT) – i.e. the treatment effect for treated farm households, which 
is the difference between equations [9a] and [10a] or [9m] and [10m] as an example. 
 
Method for addressing potential endogeneity 
An issue that needs to be addressed in estimating equation [1] is the potential endogeneity 
problem that may arise. It is therefore important to account for any potential reverse causality 
between the adoption decision of risk management strategies and the outcomes of interest. A 
potential source of endogeneity identified in the empirical literature comes from the risk 
attitude of a farmer. The risk profile or risk perception of a farmer may influence the choice of 
risk management strategy. Risk management strategies employed by a farmer can potentially 
correlate to his or her risk profile or risk perception. Studies by Pennings and Leuthold (2000), 
Miyata (2003), Sherrick et al., (2004), Wik et al., (2004), Pennings  et al., (2008), Kouamé 
(2010), Dercon and Christiaensen (2011), Theuvsen (2013), Ullah and Shivakoti (2014), Ullah 
et al., (2015), Meraner and Finger (2017), and Asravor (2019) all show that farmers’ risk 
attitudes are positively correlated with the choice of risk management strategy. Since some of 
the risk management strategies employed by farmers are technologies and management 
practices based, farm households having access to agricultural extension agents might be 
encouraged to adopt these strategies. At the same time, farm households adopting these risk 
management strategies may potentially attract more visits by extension staff than non-adopters. 
Thus, risk attitude and extension variables may be jointly determined with the decision of farm 
households choosing to adopt risk management strategies. Hence, we follow  previously studies 
(see Abdulai and Huffman, 2015; and Ma and Abdulai, 2016), and control for potential 
endogeneity of the variables using the control function approach10 (Wooldridge, 2015). Due to 
the dichotomous nature of both variables, we employed a logit regression specification of the 
potential endogenous variable (i.e. risk attitude and extension) as a function of all other 
variables used in selection equation11 (i.e. equation [1]) in addition to instrumental variables in 
the first-stage estimation, such as:  
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝜏 + 𝐺𝑖𝑗𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗        [11] 
where Si is vector of the observed potential endogenous variables, X is as described previously 
in equation [1], Gij is a vector of instrumental variables and ϵij is the random error term. To 
ensure identification in the estimation of the adoption specification, some of the variables 
included in the first-stage estimation in equation [11] are excluded from the adoption equation 
in [1]. Just as previously explained, the employed instruments should strongly influence the 
given potential endogenous variables (i.e. risk attitude and extension) but not the choice of the 
risk management strategies. For the purpose of our study, two variables included as instruments 
in equation [11] are storage technology used by farm household which is expected to influence 
risk attitude but not expected to influence the choice of risk management strategies, and the 
need for support and type of support needed, which is expected to influence extension access 
but not the choice of risk management strategies. In addition, it is also worth noting here that 
the instrumental variable(s) used here is expected to not correlate with the other instrumental 
variables used for the multinomial endogenous switching regression model identification12. We 
incorporated both potential endogenous variables and the estimated residuals13 predicted from 
equation [11] in the selection equation [1] to account for endogeneity as follows:  
𝑈𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑆𝑖𝜗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝛼 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗     [12] 
where Xij is as defined previously, Si is a vector of the observed potential endogenous variables 
(risk attitude and extension access), and Rij is a vector of the “generalized residuals” terms from 
the first-stage regressions of the endogenous variables in equation [11]. The endogenous 
variables become appropriately exogenous in a second-stage estimation equation by adding 
appropriate “generalized residuals” since they serve as the control function. As suggested by 
Wooldridge (2015), the approach leads to robust, regression-based Hausman test for 
                                                          
10 This is also known as a two-stage residual inclusion model in the empirical literature (see Gibson et al., 2010; Terza, 2017; Harris and Kessler, 2019) 
11 Results of the control function are not provided but are available on request 
12 In appendix A1, we provide results of the correlation of instruments and our outcomes of interest 
13 Wooldridge (2015, Pp. 427 – 428) proposes estimating a “generalized residuals” which uses the inverse Mills ratio (the ratio of the standard normal density, ϕ, 
divided by the standard normal cumulative distribution function, Φ) to compute the “generalized residuals”.  
endogeneity of the suspected variables. If the coefficient of the residual term is statistically 
significant, it shows that endogeneity was indeed present and also well controlled for in the 
model (Gibson et al., 2010; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011; Amankwah et al., 2016; Harris and 
Kessler, 2019; Katengeza et al., 2019; Ogutu et al., 2019). Furthermore,  Wooldridge (2015) 
observed that if the coefficient on the estimated generalized residual are statistically significant, 
there is a need to adjust the standard errors for the two-step estimation by bootstrapping. 
 
The empirical specification 
The specification of our empirical model is based on economic theory, empirical studies on 
risk management strategies adoption (Goodwin et al., 2004; McNamara and Weiss, 2005; 
Finocchio and Esposti, 2008; Tavernier and Onyango, 2008; Ashfaq et al., 2008; Velandia et 
al., 2009; Deressa et al., 2010; Poon and Weersink, 2011; Dadzie and Acquah, 2012; Enjolras 
et al., 2012; Amanor-Boadu, 2013; Bowman and Zilberman, 2013; Bryan et al., 2013; Nienaber 
and Slavič, 2013; Bartolini et al., 2014; Ullah and Shivakoti, 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Ullah 
et al., 2015; Meraner and Finger, 2017; Asravor, 2019; Vigani and Kathage, 2019) and factors 
affecting the variability of farm incomes (Pope and Prescott, 1980; Dunn and Williams, 2000; 
Schurle and Tholstrup, 1987, 1989; Purdy et al., 1997; Barry et al., 2001; Poon and Weersink, 
2011; Enjolras et al., 2012). Following this literature, we summarized variables that are 
hypothesized to affect risk management strategies adoption decisions, agriculture income and 
standard deviation of agriculture income.  
These are farm household characteristics (age, gender, education of household head, 
household size, labour use, income transfers/remittances, risk attitude, nature of farm work, 
household welfare index(HWI)14, membership of farmer-based organizations, access to credit, 
subsidies, and irrigation use), farm characteristics (size of land holding, number of crops 
grown, share of land under cash crops, and soil quality15), risk indicators (risk count, loss count, 
mean annual rainfall and temperature from 2000 to 201516 and the standard deviation of rainfall 
and temperature from 2000 to 2015), access to information (access to extension and market 
information), and location variables (distance to major road and market). In addition, mean 
land holding, fertilizer, seed quantities used and production cost were included as control for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  Table 2 presents the definition of the variables used in the analysis. 
The summary statistics of variables across the various risk management strategies and the 
pooled data is presented in Table A4 of appendix A3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 We computed a household welfare index which is proxy for household wealth using principal component analysis (PCA) based on farm household access to 
basic amenities such as water, electricity, toilet, the type of roof, wall and floor material, and the number of sleeping rooms in the household. 
15 For soil quality, we computed a soil quality index using publicly available data from International Soil Reference and Information Centre (ISRIC – World Soil 
Information). We describe the computation of this index in appendix A6. 
16 Rainfall and temperature datasets used are from the Climate Hazards Center of the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
Table 2: Variables definition and summary statistics 
Name Variable description 
Outcome variables  
Agriculture income Log17 of agriculture (crop and livestock) income in CFA 
Std. agriculture income Standard deviation of log of agriculture income in CFA 
Farm household characteristics 
Age Age of household head in years 
Gender  =1 if household is male-headed 
Education =1 if household head has formal education 
HH size Number of people residing in the household 
Total labour Total labour used by household 
Risk attitude =1 if risk taking 
 Nature of work =1 if farm work is done on part-time basis 
Transfers =1 if household receives cash remittances 
Subsidy =1 if access to subsidies 
Credit access =1 if access to credit 
Irrigation =1 if farmer uses irrigation 
HWI Household welfare index 
Agriculture income share Agricultural income share (%) in total household income 
Nonfarm income Total nonfarm income (CFA) 
Farm characteristics 
Land holding  Total land area farmed by household (ha) 
Crop portfolio Number of crops cultivated by household 
Cash crop Share of land under cash crops (%) 
SQI Soil quality index 
Risk indicators 
Std. Rainfall Standard deviation of rainfall (2000 – 2015) 
Rainfall Mean annual rainfall in mm (2000 – 2015) 
Std. Temperature Standard deviation of temperature (2000 – 2015) 
Temperature Mean annual temperature in °C (2000 – 2015) 
Risk count Number of production risks faced by household 
Loss count Number of risk related losses experienced by household 
Access to information 
Extension access =1 if accessed extension service 
Market information =1 if accessed market information 
Location variables  
Road Log of distance to the nearest road (km) 
Market Log of distance to the nearest market (km) 
Mundlak Fixed Effects 
Mean land holding Mean land (ha) allocation across all crops grown 
Mean fertilizer quantity Mean fertilizer (kg) use across all crops grown 
Mean seed quantity Mean seed (kg) use across all crops grown 
Mean production cost Mean production cost (FCFA) across all crops grown 
Instrumental variables  
Membership =1 if member of farmer-based organization 
Insurance needs =1 if farmer has specific insurance needs 
Insurance knowledge =1 if farmer has ever heard of farm insurance 
Storage technology =1 if household use metal silos 
Support needs =1 if farmer has support needs 
Type support needs =1 if training on good farming practices is needed 
 
 
                                                          
17 The logarithm of variables used in the analysis were to the base 10.  
3.2 Study area and data 
As a West African country, Senegal is a country within the Sahel region. The country has six 
agro-ecological zones, based on biophysical and socioeconomic criteria and these are; Niayes, 
Senegal River Valley, Sylvo-pastoral Zone, Groundnut Basin, Eastern Senegal and Casamance. 
These agro-ecological zones have unimodal rainfall, hence they are characterized by varying 
levels of rainfall and temperature with conditions that gradually become increasingly dry 
moving north from Senegal’s high rainfall southern regions to its northern arid zones. The 
length of the rainy season differs from one year to the next and from one region to the other. 
With more than 95% of the total cropped area depending on rain-fed and less than 1% of 
agricultural land under irrigation, the growing season in Senegal strongly correlates to the rainy 
season. The strong dependence of crop production on rainfall results in highly variable 
production, as both rainfall amounts and the onset and cessation of the rains are subject to 
marked space-time variability and temporal changes (D’Alessandro et al., 2015).The main 
crops cultivated in Senegal by smallholders are groundnuts and millet, which together account 
for almost 75% of the planted area. Maize, rice sorghum, cowpeas, and cotton make up about 
25% and less than 1% is sown to other crops, including vegetables (D’Alessandro et al., 2015). 
The data used in the study comes from a farm household survey as part of the larger Senegalese 
“Projet d’appui aux politiques agricoles (PAPA)” or the Agricultural Policy Support Project. 
The farm household survey was conducted from between April and May 2017 across all the 14 
administrative regions of Senegal and all the departments with the exception of the departments 
of Dakar, Pikine and Guédiawaye. A total of 42 agricultural departments were included in the 
survey. The survey was targeted towards cereals, horticultural crops, and fruit and vegetable 
producers. The survey design was a two-stage, nationally based random survey that included 
rural census districts as the primary units and farm households as the secondary units. The 
method consisted of first dividing the statistical population (i.e. agricultural households) in the 
primary units so that each of them is unambiguously related to a well-defined primary unit. 
Then samples were drawn in two stages. In the first stage, a sample of rural census districts 
was drawn and in the second stage, a sample of agricultural households was selected at the 
level of each primary unit. In rural census districts where rainfed agriculture was practice and 
localized crops were grown such as Senegal River Valley and Niayes Market Gardening Zone, 
a stratification of the rural census districts was done before agricultural households were 
selected. Data collected include information on household demographic characteristics, plot 
and land holdings, agricultural equipment ownership, crop production for the 2016/2017 
growing season, credit, inputs use and cost, family and hired labour, sales volumes and process. 
Others included household consumption, access to amenities, non-farm and livestock revenue, 
remittance, agricultural insurance, risks and adaptation strategies, perception on subsidized 
fertilizer, seeds and agricultural equipment, and membership of farmer-based organizations. 
 
4.0 Empirical Results 
In this section we first investigate factors driving the adoption of the various risk management 
strategies in isolation or combination. Secondly, we present the economic implications 
associated with each risk management portfolio on household agriculture incomes and the 
standard deviation of agriculture. We do not however discuss results of the econometric 
estimation of agriculture income and the standard deviation18 of agriculture income model. 
Related results are however provided in appendix A4 and A5. The selectivity correction terms 
(rmp0 to rmp7) in Table A5 and A6 are significant in some of the risk management portfolio 
equations. This indicates the presence of sample selectivity effects and using OLS would have 
produced biased and inconsistent estimates. Thus, accounting for selectivity effects using the 
Multinomial Endogenous Switching Regression model was appropriate. 
Table 3 shows the results of the multinomial logit model for the different risk management 
portfolios. We find that the multinomial logit model fits the data well, the Wald test is highly 
significant, hence rejecting the null hypothesis that all the regression coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero. Furthermore, the test for joint significance of instruments across the different 
risk management portfolios are highly significant. The results from the control-function 
specification indicate that the correction for endogeneity in the model was necessary. We find 
the coefficient of the risk residual term to be statistically significant in four of the risk 
management portfolios, implying the presence of endogeneity of risk attitude. 
 
 
Drivers of Risk Management Strategies 
The relative probability of adopting risk mitigation (RMP1) is strongly negative and 
statistically significant for farmers’ characteristics; education of household head, risk attitude, 
nature of work, wealth and the share of agriculture income in total household income. This 
suggest that household heads with formal education, risk taking farmers, working part-time on 
the farm, wealthier households and having higher shares of agriculture incomes in total 
household income are less likely to adopt risk mitigation as a risk management strategy. 
Conversely, we fine the number of crops grown, number of risk and losses experienced, 
insurance needs and insurance knowledge to be strongly positive and statistically significant 
for the adoption of risk mitigation. The effect of membership of farmer-based organizations is 
negative and statistically significant. 
We find that the probability of adopting risk transfer (RMP2) is statistically significant for 
farmers’ characteristics; education of household head and credit access. Hence a household 
head having formal education, and having access to credit are more likely to adopt risk transfer 
as a risk management strategy. The number of losses experienced by a household is positive 
and statistically significant for the adoption of risk transfer. The probability of adopting risk 
coping (RMP3) is positive and statistically significant for total labour used, nature of work and 
credit access. Risk attitude and wealth are positive and statistically significant for adopting risk 
coping strategies. The number of crops grown, soil fertility, number of risks experienced, 
distance to major road, insurance needs and knowledge are positive and statistically significant 
for the adoption of risk coping. On the contrary, membership of famer-based organizations is 
negative and statistically significant for the adoption of risk coping. 
 
                                                          
18 Due to space, we do not show results for the moment of agriculture income for each regime. However, the results are available upon request 
With respect to the combination of strategies, we find that risk mitigation and transfer (RMP4) 
adoption is positive and statistically significant for age of the household head, credit access and 
irrigation use. Risk attitude is however negative and statistically significant for the adoption of 
risk mitigation and transfer. Furthermore, membership of farmer-based organizations and 
insurance needs are positive and statistically significant for adoption. An increase in the 
standard deviation of temperature is associated with a less likely adoption risk mitigation and 
transfer as a risk management strategy. 
The relative probability of adopting risk mitigation and coping (RMP5) is strongly negative 
and statistically significant for education level of household head, risk attitude, wealth and the 
share of agriculture income in total household income. However, farm household 
characteristics related to total labour, nature of work and subsidy access is strongly positive 
and statistically significant for adopting risk mitigation and coping portfolio. Furthermore, the 
number of crop commodities grown, the number of risk and losses experienced, and insurance 
needs and knowledge are positive and statistically significant for the adoption of risk mitigation 
and coping. On the contrary, membership of famer-based organizations is negative and 
statistically significant for adoption. 
Lastly, the relative probability of risk transfer and coping (RMP7) adoption is strongly positive 
and statistically significant for irrigation use, the number of losses experienced and insurance 
needs. In summary, we find that the probability to adopt the six risk management portfolios is 
largely driven risk attitude, the number of losses experienced, membership of farmer-based 
organizations and insurance needs.  
Table 3: Parameter estimates of risk management portfolios adoption, Multinomial Logit Selection Model 
 
RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 RMP4 RMP5 RMP7 
Variable Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 0.005 0.005 -0.008 0.027 -0.003 0.006 0.029* 0.016 -0.001 0.006 0.009 0.023 
Gender -0.073 0.235 1.631 9.063 0.395 0.271 0.512 1.780 0.232 0.302 -0.860 3.562 
Education -0.254* 0.141 1.571* 0.811 -0.207 0.154 -0.082 0.384 -0.377** 0.172 0.169 0.528 
HH size 0.004 0.017 0.123 0.093 0.022 0.018 0.031 0.043 -0.001 0.019 0.040 0.070 
Total labour 0.034 0.022 -0.011 0.131 0.045* 0.025 -0.016 0.084 0.059** 0.024 -0.045 0.128 
Risk attitude -2.193*** 0.603 0.027 6.363 -2.699*** 0.644 -3.980** 1.808 -2.762*** 0.721 -0.635 5.321 
Nature of work 0.385** 0.154 -0.120 0.785 0.851*** 0.166 0.624 0.419 0.774*** 0.181 0.866 0.614 
Transfer -0.145 0.242 -1.382 1.341 -0.133 0.260 -1.259 2.530 0.339 0.281 0.106 4.890 
Subsidy 0.331 0.248 2.023 2.337 0.310 0.263 0.536 0.873 1.085*** 0.291 1.205 1.439 
Credit access 0.505 0.434 1.658* 0.899 0.822* 0.455 1.849*** 0.621 0.278 0.503 1.562 0.948 
Irrigation 0.295 0.202 1.574 0.993 0.048 0.225 1.387*** 0.533 -0.046 0.257 1.366* 0.819 
HWI -0.098** 0.047 0.247 0.252 -0.126*** 0.048 0.143 0.121 -0.161*** 0.057 -0.062 0.182 
Agriculture income share -1.157** 0.446 21.636 342.226 -0.334 0.471 0.954 1.626 -1.367*** 0.475 1.623 75.046 
Land holding 0.009 0.019 0.020 0.057 0.016 0.019 0.011 0.026 0.006 0.020 0.021 0.073 
Crop portfolio 0.265** 0.105 0.729 0.525 0.568*** 0.114 0.408 0.294 0.439*** 0.123 0.070 0.626 
Cash crop 0.083 0.329 -2.189 61.390 0.142 0.339 -0.890 1.203 0.612 0.377 0.153 1.583 
SQI 0.904 0.972 3.644 4.687 3.148*** 1.047 0.925 2.530 -0.171 1.157 -0.629 4.454 
Std. Rainfall -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.009 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.006 
Std. Temperature 0.025 0.110 0.080 0.531 0.057 0.120 -0.493* 0.295 0.104 0.130 -0.170 0.395 
Risk count 0.293*** 0.105 -2.720 12.268 0.310*** 0.110 0.271 0.176 0.647*** 0.110 0.068 0.286 
Loss count 0.265** 0.122 1.134** 0.474 0.145 0.133 0.160 0.238 0.574*** 0.133 0.583** 0.290 
Extension access -0.102 0.449 1.625 2.197 0.085 0.508 1.952 1.211 -0.577 0.547 -0.937 1.763 
Notes: The base category is farm households that did not adopt any of the risk management portfolios (i.e. RMP0). RMP1 – denotes risk mitigation, RMP2 – denotes risk 
transfer, RMP3 – denotes risk coping, RMP4 – denotes risk mitigation and transfer, RMP5 – denotes risk mitigation and coping and RMP7 – denotes risk transfer and coping. 
***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the bootstrapped standard errors. 
 
 
Table 3: Parameter estimates of risk management portfolios adoption, Multinomial Logit Selection Model (continued) 
 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 RMP4 RMP5 RMP7 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Market information -0.141 0.136 0.183 0.635 -0.167 0.146 0.142 0.328 -0.072 0.160 -0.457 0.509 
Road -0.070 0.095 0.435 0.559 0.169* 0.102 0.093 0.208 -0.137 0.108 -0.204 0.348 
Market 0.191 0.157 0.725 1.008 -0.129 0.161 -0.009 0.464 0.049 0.179 0.261 0.514 
Membership -0.701*** 0.229 -1.013 1.079 -0.987*** 0.265 1.313** 0.631 -0.820*** 0.301 -0.314 0.947 
Insurance needs 0.638*** 0.152 -0.234 0.686 1.054*** 0.169 2.144*** 0.410 0.538*** 0.183 16.396*** 1.675 
Insurance knowledge 0.317* 0.184 -1.517 0.982 0.488** 0.194 3.606 5.293 0.987*** 0.208 3.830 7.520 
Resid risk attitude 0.636** 0.324 1.044 2.075 1.129*** 0.343 1.600 0.996 0.841** 0.386 1.109 2.066 
Resid extension access 0.053 0.228 -0.888 1.557 -0.054 0.254 -0.360 0.631 0.258 0.264 0.693 0.916 
Constant 1.578 1.019 -37.709 347.077 -2.035* 1.090 -9.970 6.559 -1.518 1.160 -24.724 76.623 
Joint sig Instruments 
(χ2) in agriculture 
income equation 
34.83*** 2.46 68.37*** 30.94*** 50.49*** 96.8*** 
Wald test, χ2 (180) 1367.86*** 
N 3048 43 1004 81 693 37 
Notes: The base category is farm households that did not adopt any of the risk management portfolios (i.e. RMP0). RMP1 – denotes risk mitigation, RMP2 – denotes risk 
transfer, RMP3 – denotes risk coping, RMP4 – denotes risk mitigation and transfer, RMP5 – denotes risk mitigation and coping and RMP7 – denotes risk transfer and coping. 
***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the bootstrapped standard errors. 
 
Economic Implications of Risk Management Strategies 
The objective of this paper, is to identify which optimal risk management strategies allow 
households to maximize their objectives in terms of expected income and variability of income. 
In this section, we therefore attempt to determine the “best” tools, in terms of stabilizing farm 
households’ agriculture incomes. The economic implications of adopting each risk 
management portfolio on farm households’ agricultural incomes and the standard deviation of 
income measured in terms of the average treatment effects (ATT) for the treated farm 
households are presented in Table 4 and 5 respectively. After controlling for the effects of 
several covariates and the selection bias stemming from both unobserved and observed factors 
on household agriculture incomes, the adoption of some of the risk management portfolios is 
associated with significant positive incomes. For some risk management strategies, the 
observed effects are negative. 
Regarding the adoption of single risk management strategies, we find that the adoption of risk 
coping strategies provides higher agriculture incomes compared to a counterfactual case where 
farm households did not adopt risk coping as a risk management measure. This is not surprising 
because risk coping strategies rely largely on the sale of assets. By using risk coping as a 
strategy, farm households obtain about 39% more agriculture income and this effect is 
statistically significant at 1%. Risk coping might be an effective strategy to smooth household 
consumption in the short-run. However in the long-run, poorer households might be unable to 
recover the loss of productive assets ex post the shock (Bhandari et al., 2007; Barnett et al., 
2008; Amare et al., 2018), which might partly be due to the cost in terms of production 
efficiency and reduced profits (World Bank, 2005b). 
Table 4: Impact on agriculture income by risk management strategy 
Portfolio 
Actual 
agriculture 
income 
Counterfactual 
agriculture 
income - If 
households did 
not adopt  ATT 
Change 
(%) 
Risk mitigation 5.337(0.007) 5.358(0.008) -0.021**(0.011) -4.72 
Risk transfer 6.125(0.097) 6.580(0.122) -0.455***(0.156) -64.92 
Risk coping 5.564(0.011) 5.421(0.015) 0.142***(0.019) 38.68 
Risk mitigation + transfer 5.762(0.054) 5.856(0.055) -0.094(0.077) -19.46 
Risk mitigation + coping 5.566(0.010) 5.429(0.016) 0.137***(0.019) 37.09 
Risk transfer + coping 5.875(0.094) 5.884(0.213) -0.009(0.233) -2.05 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** represent 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. The change expressed 
in percentage in terms of treatment effect was computed using the formula 100(10ATT – 1). 
The adoption of risk mitigation and risk transfer leads to lower agriculture income compared 
to the counterfactual case of non-adoption. The effect is particularly statistically significant at 
5% for households that adopted risk mitigation as a risk management strategy. The effect is 
also statistically significant (1%) for households that adopted risk transfer as a risk management 
strategy. This implies that by using risk mitigation and transfer as a risk management strategy, 
farm households obtain about 5% and 65% lower agriculture incomes compared to the 
counterfactual case. The result is rather surprising, because risk transfer, herein insurance use, 
should allow farm households to use more of productive inputs such as organic fertilizer, 
improved or high yielding varieties of crops. Nonetheless, the result might be explained by 
some findings reported in the empirical literature. For instance, in the US, Smith and Goodwin 
(1996) found that fertilizer and chemical use among Kansas wheat producers tended to be 
negatively correlated with insurance purchases. They found that, producers who purchased 
insurance use less inputs than those producers that did not buy insurance. Similarly, Giné and 
Yang (2009) and De Nicola (2015)  finds insurance contracts to significantly reduce total input 
and investments in new agricultural opportunities. In Hungary, Spörri et al., (2012) also found 
a negative impact of insurance on farm profit, labour and land productivity in arable farms. 
Furthermore, some risk transfer products have been found to reduce the use of complementary 
risk management strategies such as diversification (Schaffnit-Chatterjee, 2010). This crowding 
out effect could potentially have cascading effects which might be reflected in incomes. 
Although we observed from the data (see Table A4 in appendix) that aside land use, risk 
transferring households use higher levels of fertilizer, seeds and hired labour use per hectare 
compare to farm households using the other risk management strategies, behavioural changes 
of insurance policy holders in terms of effort devoted towards their farming activities might 
explain the findings. As shown in previous studies (see Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith 
and Goodwin, 1996; Goodwin et al., 2004; Goodwin, 2001) insurance use leads to moral 
hazard problems and farmers with insurance are likely not going to take care in their production 
activities compared to a situation without insurance. 
Reduction of cultivated areas and orientation to non-agricultural activities consists of about 
55% of risk mitigation strategies (see Table A1 in appendix). Intuitively, there is an opportunity 
cost related effect to the use of these strategies. The use of these strategies causes losses in 
agriculture income. Furthermore, production or agricultural diversification in particular could 
lead to shifts or reallocation of resources (land) for high value crops and staple crops and this 
can have a negative effect on agriculture income, when a household income is largely 
dependent on the sale of high value crops and yields for high value crops are lower relative to 
staple crops (Morduch, 1995; Salazar-Espinoza et al., 2015). Evidently, we find that farm 
households using mitigation strategies allocate about 50.3% of their cultivated lands towards 
staple crops production and only about 26.8% towards cash crops. As argued by Skees et al., 
(2002) and Larochelle and Alwang (2013) diversification can also hinder important gains that 
can be obtain from specialization. Other results also suggests that diversification is beneficial 
up to a certain threshold only (Schoney et al., 1994). Also, by renting out land, there is an 
opportunity cost related to the farm household using the land for a profitable agriculture 
enterprise. 
Results of the combined adoption of risk management strategies shows the farm households 
adopting risk mitigation with coping, significantly obtain higher agriculture incomes (37% 
more) compared to the counterfactual case they did not adopt this combination. Though not 
statistically significant, we find that farm households adopting risk mitigation with risk transfer 
earn lower agriculture incomes compared to the counterfactual case of not adopting. 
Furthermore, we find that households adopting risk transfer with coping earn lower agriculture 
incomes compared to the counterfactual case. However, the observed effect is not significant. 
The effect of risk management on agriculture income shows that the use of risk coping as a 
strategy in isolation or a combination of risk mitigation and coping significantly leads to about 
38% more agriculture incomes than any other strategy in isolation or in combination.  
Results of the effect of risk management on dispersions around agriculture incomes for farm 
households is presented in Table 5. Managing production risks either through single strategies 
or in combinations in effect helps to reduce dispersions around agriculture incomes. By using 
risk mitigation as a risk management strategy, farm households reduce dispersions around 
agriculture incomes by about 11% and this effect is statistically significant at 1%. Transferring 
risks allow farm households to reduce dispersions around agriculture by about 99% compared 
to the counterfactual case of not transferring. The effect is statistically significant at 1%. Risk 
coping measures employed by farm households significantly reduces dispersions around 
agriculture incomes by about 20% compared to the counterfactual case of not employing risk 
coping measures. Farm households that use risk mitigation in combination with risk transfer 
are able to reduce dispersions around agriculture incomes by about 39% compared to a 
counterfactual case of not using this combination. We also find that households using risk 
mitigation and coping in combination reduce dispersions around agriculture income by about 
17% and the effect is statistically significant at 1%. Concurrently, the use of risk transfer and 
coping in combination reduces dispersions around agriculture incomes by about 50% with the 
effect being statistically significant at 1%.  
Table 5: Dispersions impact on agriculture income by risk management strategy 
Portfolio 
Actual 
standard 
deviation of 
agriculture 
income 
Counterfactual 
standard 
deviation of 
agriculture 
income - If 
households did 
not adopt  ATT 
Change 
(%) 
Risk mitigation 0.345(0.002) 0.391(0.004) -0.047***(0.004) 11.43 
Risk transfer 0.177(0.022) 0.475(0.026) -0.298***(0.034) 98.61 
Risk coping 0.283(0.003) 0.363(0.006) -0.080***(0.007) 20.23 
Risk mitigation + transfer 0.298(0.018) 0.441(0.018) -0.143***(0.025) 39.00 
Risk mitigation + coping 0.273(0.003) 0.342(0.007) -0.069***(0.008) 17.22 
Risk transfer + coping 0.203(0.026) 0.379(0.030) -0.176***(0.040) 49.97 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** represent 1% significance level. The change expressed in percentage in terms 
of treatment effect was computed using the formula 100(10ATT – 1). 
Risk transfer strategies appear to be very effective in reducing dispersions around agriculture 
incomes when used in isolation, compared to when combined with other strategies. When risk 
transfer is considered as the main risk management strategy used by a farm household, 
combining it with risk mitigation, leads to a dispersion reduction effect on agriculture income 
by only 39%. In parallel, the use of risk transfer in combination with risk coping measures 
reduce dispersions around agriculture incomes by about 50%. Contrarily, if risk mitigation is 
considered as the main risk management strategy, it is observed to not be as effective as when 
combined with other risk management strategies. In combination with risk transfer, the 
dispersion reduction effect is about 40% compare with 11% when used in isolation. Similarly, 
the dispersion reduction effect when used in combination with coping strategies is about 17%. 
Likewise, the effect of risk coping is observed to be stronger when combined with risk transfer 
strategies compared with risk mitigation strategies. When used as the main risk management 
strategy, the dispersion reduction effect of risk coping on agriculture income is only 20% but 
in combination with risk transfer this is about 50%. 
5.0 Conclusion and policy implications 
This study sought to investigate how effective the various risk management strategies 
employed by farm households to deal with risk are and to identify which optimal risk 
management strategies allow households to maximize their objectives in terms of expected 
income and variability of income. We employed a multinomial endogenous switching 
regression that accounts for selectivity bias and a moment-based approach to determine the 
impacts of the various risk management strategies on agriculture incomes and its dispersions 
around agriculture incomes in a multinomial framework. We find mixed results of the impact 
of risk management on agriculture incomes. More specifically, we find a positive impact of 
risk coping strategies on farm household agriculture incomes. Risk management through risk 
mitigation strategies appears to erode net agriculture incomes because these strategies are 
preliminarily related to opportunity cost of farm incomes and suboptimal allocation of 
productive resources. We find that when risk mitigation strategies are implemented in 
combination with risk coping strategies, the net impact is significantly higher, allowing farm 
households to gain more agriculture incomes. 
Interestingly, we find that the adoption of risk transfer as a risk management strategy leads to 
significantly lower agriculture incomes compared to the counterfactual case of non-adoption. 
Although the result is rather baffling, we are of the view that some underlying factors might 
explain the observed outcome. Firstly, the presence the use of insurance may relate to moral 
hazard problems, with insurance policy holders not taking care or expending effort in their 
production activities. Secondly, the use of risk transfer might crowd out the use of other risk 
management strategies which might have complementary effects or benefits on agriculture 
incomes. Aside the adoption of risk mitigation and coping in combination, we find no statistical 
evidence that more comprehensive risk management strategies lead to higher agriculture 
incomes. We find that the adoption of risk mitigation with transfer, and risk transfer with 
coping leads to lower agriculture incomes compared to the counterfactual case of non-adoption 
of these combinations. 
We find that the adoption of risk management strategies by farm households are effective in 
reducing the dispersions around agriculture incomes. Risk transfer has the highest observed 
effect on reducing dispersions around agriculture income. The use of risk transfer reduces 
dispersions around agriculture incomes by about 99%. More specifically, we find that adopting 
risk transfer in combination with other strategies lowers the dispersion reduction effect relative 
to using only risk transfer as a management strategy. On the contrary we find that if risk 
management strategies other than risk transfer is considered as the main risk management 
strategy employed by a household, combination with other strategies generally improves the 
dispersion reduction effectiveness compared to being used in isolation. 
Our findings have some important policy implication. First, there is a need for a more targeted 
and systematic approach to agricultural risk management. Of particular relevance is the need 
for several kinds of implementation instruments such agricultural investments and technical 
assistance that can amplify the benefits of some of the risk management strategies employed 
by households. Investments related to the provision of climate information for example can be 
beneficial in helping farmers select the right crop commodities to produce for a particular 
season and at what time within the season to sow for instance. At the same time, empowering 
farmer’s management of climate risks will require the adoption of context-suitable agricultural 
practices such as conservation agriculture, sustainable land management practices etc. and 
technologies which are important low-cost risk mitigation strategies such as improved and 
drought resistant varieties of crops. This will require the provision of information and technical 
assistance to farmers in the use and implementation of these practices. 
Risk transfer products such as index-based insurance should be widely promoted to farm 
household since they appear to better manage production risks. However, to achieved this there 
is a need to overcome some socioeconomic and institutional barriers to the adoption of risk 
transfer products. There is a need to improve better access to credit and offer comprehensive 
information on how insurance works. This is because we find credit access and information 
about insurance to be positively correlated with the adoption of risk management strategies. 
Most importantly, there is the need for better insurance product designs that highly correlates 
indemnification with losses experienced by farmers. Although we observed that farm 
households using risk transfer as a risk management strategy come from all but one of the 14 
administrative regions of Senegal involved in the survey, coverage is still very low. There is 
therefore the need to scale up the product to more farm households. This can be done through 
the use of farmer-based organizations for instance, since they are important in influencing the 
use of risk management strategies. Additionally, offering index insurance products through 
farmer-based organizations can lower related administrative costs. 
In conclusion, there are some important caveats to be considered for this study. Due to lack of 
panel or longitudinal datasets, the study relied solely on cross-sectional data. Hence the analysis 
used in this paper is a static one and also neglects the dynamic behaviour of production systems. 
Also, the effectiveness of the various risk managements strategies might have both temporal 
and spatial dimensions which is not evaluated in this study. Some of the studied risk 
management strategies can be effective in the short run, while others might deliver payoffs in 
the long run. Hence, having access to data with a long-time dimension on various production 
systems, agriculture incomes and risk management strategies employed by farm households 
would allow for the investigation of all these dimensions and provide a better comparison 
between the various risk management strategies. Such data would be needed to provide more 
robust evidence on the implication of risk management on important household welfare 
outcomes. Furthermore, since we clustered the various risk management strategies into three 
broad typologies, we failed to evaluate their individual impacts. Because production conditions 
and the scope of risk management strategies are heterogeneous across farms, focusing on 
aggregate effects as we did in this study may obscure individual strategy specific effects for 
instance. 
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Table A1: Risk management strategies employed by farm households 
Risk management strategies Frequency % 
Risk mitigation   
Diversify agricultural activities 2095 39% 
Reduce the area under cultivation 1074 20% 
Orientation to non-agricultural activities 1610 30% 
Rent land to others 122 2% 
   
Risk transfer   
Subscribe to agricultural insurance 177 3% 
   
Risk coping   
Sell grain stocks 483 9% 
Sell property 462 9% 
Sale of animals 1062 20% 
Exchange/swap clothes or jewels for food 79 1% 
Total 5312 100% 
 
 
Table A2: Correlation test of instrumental variables 
 
Std. 
agric 
income 
Log 
agric 
income 
Membershi
p of FBO 
Insuranc
e needs 
Insurance 
knowledge 
Storage 
technology 
Type of 
support 
needs 
Need 
for 
support 
Std. agric 
income 1        
Log agric 
income -0.2001 1       
Membership 
of FBO 0.0033 0.1131 1      
Insurance 
needs -0.0375 0.1246 0.1274 1     
Insurance 
knowledge 0.0019 0.1472 0.1900 0.2841 1    
Storage 
technology -0.0632 0.0525 -0.0512 -0.0546 -0.0303 1   
Type of 
support 
needs -0.0472 0.0592 0.1074 0.1152 0.0815 0.0057 1  
Need for 
support -0.0359 0.0669 0.0995 0.2191 0.1424 0.0212 0.5872 1 
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Table A3: Test of the validity of the instrument (falsification test) on non-adopters 
 No risk management 
Log of agriculture 
income 
Std. of agriculture 
income 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Age -0.005 0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Gender 0.073 0.242 0.404*** 0.118 -0.082 0.080 
Education 0.254* 0.141 0.037 0.070 0.008 0.047 
HH size -0.004 0.017 -0.010 0.009 0.006 0.006 
Total labour -0.034 0.022 0.034** 0.016 -0.020* 0.011 
Risk attitude 2.193*** 0.612 0.097 0.076 0.009 0.051 
Nature of work -0.385** 0.153 -0.064 0.075 0.096* 0.050 
Transfer 0.145 0.236 0.050 0.102 0.019 0.069 
Subsidy -0.331 0.258 0.200** 0.079 -0.134** 0.053 
Credit access -0.505 0.396 0.105 0.173 0.227* 0.117 
Irrigation -0.295 0.198 0.677*** 0.104 -0.011 0.070 
HWI 0.098** 0.046 0.001 0.023 -0.024 0.015 
Agriculture income share 1.157** 0.488 0.384* 0.212 -0.081 0.143 
Land holding -0.009 0.017 0.015*** 0.004 0.002 0.003 
Crop portfolio -0.265** 0.106 0.191*** 0.040 -0.051* 0.027 
Cash crop -0.083 0.339 0.417*** 0.141 -0.082 0.095 
SQI -0.904 0.985 0.864** 0.361 0.353 0.243 
Std. Rainfall 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Std. Temperature -0.025 0.109 -0.088 0.055 0.035 0.037 
Risk count -0.293*** 0.105 -0.051 0.034 -0.001 0.023 
Loss count -0.265** 0.115 0.049 0.040 0.021 0.027 
Extension access 0.102 0.421 0.003 0.095 -0.025 0.064 
Market information 0.141 0.137 -0.055 0.065 0.036 0.043 
Road 0.070 0.094 0.049 0.043 0.021 0.029 
Market -0.191 0.161 0.223** 0.086 0.018 0.058 
Membership 0.701*** 0.223 0.158* 0.089 0.049 0.060 
Insurance needs -0.638*** 0.159 0.102 0.084 -0.005 0.057 
Insurance knowledge -0.317* 0.180 0.032 0.085 -0.021 0.057 
Resid risk attitude -0.636** 0.323     
Resid extension access -0.053 0.198     
Constant -1.578 1.037 2.723*** 0.465 0.135 0.313 
***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Reported standard errors are the bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Table A4: Means and standard deviation of variables by risk management strategy  
 RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 RMP4 RMP5 RMP7 Total 
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Log of agric income 5.47 0.64 5.34 0.57 6.12 0.64 5.56 0.52 5.76 0.55 5.57 0.43 5.87 0.57 5.44 0.57 
Std. agric income 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.18 0.16 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.32 0.30 
Age 52.78 13.55 53.44 13.43 51.93 12.34 51.99 12.77 54.17 13.12 52.50 13.25 52.86 11.57 52.99 13.27 
Gender 0.91 0.29 0.91 0.29 0.98 0.15 0.95 0.22 0.94 0.24 0.95 0.22 0.92 0.28 0.92 0.27 
Education 0.47 0.50 0.38 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.38 0.49 
HH size 9.35 4.69 9.55 5.31 10.51 5.66 10.03 5.18 9.28 5.08 10.47 5.28 10.81 5.30 9.77 5.26 
Total labour 3.92 2.45 3.96 3.15 4.91 3.35 4.17 3.42 3.77 3.13 4.19 2.86 4.14 4.10 4.03 3.14 
Risk attitude 0.60 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.95 0.21 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.92 0.28 0.37 0.48 
Nature of work 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.61 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.61 0.49 0.73 0.45 0.54 0.50 
Transfer 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 
Subsidy 0.59 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.91 0.29 0.44 0.50 0.72 0.45 0.65 0.48 0.84 0.37 0.51 0.50 
Credit access 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.26 0.44 0.04 0.20 0.32 0.47 0.03 0.17 0.24 0.43 0.04 0.21 
Irrigation 0.28 0.45 0.20 0.40 0.86 0.35 0.13 0.33 0.73 0.45 0.10 0.29 0.65 0.48 0.19 0.39 
HWI 0.46 1.63 -0.03 1.76 0.82 2.14 -0.14 1.63 0.97 1.49 -0.29 1.51 0.22 1.76 -0.03 1.71 
Agriculture income share 0.95 0.15 0.88 0.26 1.00 0.02 0.93 0.17 0.96 0.13 0.86 0.23 0.96 0.12 0.89 0.23 
Nonfarm income 107076.2 381070.6 143865.6 504769.8 268488.4 940071.3 96016.4 296266.5 56419.8 194947.5 149520.2 375919.1 87702.7 272869.5 132643.1 449802.1 
Land holding 4.80 8.94 5.12 8.46 5.18 4.80 6.22 8.88 3.53 4.08 6.25 5.94 5.38 10.03 5.44 8.23 
Crop portfolio 1.90 1.04 2.09 1.00 1.86 1.17 2.39 1.06 1.46 0.90 2.45 1.02 1.84 1.19 2.17 1.03 
Cash crop 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.02 0.10 0.29 0.24 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.27 0.12 0.23 0.28 0.27 
SQI 0.35 0.12 0.39 0.10 0.37 0.06 0.40 0.09 0.34 0.11 0.38 0.09 0.34 0.10 0.39 0.10 
Rainfall 643.28 305.30 652.25 294.94 587.94 271.11 667.64 287.87 573.61 287.54 694.46 287.90 690.66 359.08 658.90 293.90 
Temperature 35.68 1.42 35.70 1.43 35.49 1.55 35.68 1.43 35.48 1.70 35.65 1.41 35.41 1.41 35.68 1.43 
Std. Rainfall 98.67 37.55 99.21 35.30 91.86 24.96 100.55 34.72 94.04 32.14 103.34 36.38 104.06 43.85 99.89 35.43 
Std. Temperature 2.44 0.60 2.44 0.60 2.41 0.68 2.46 0.60 2.33 0.60 2.47 0.60 2.36 0.64 2.45 0.60 
Notes: RMP1 – denotes risk mitigation, RMP2 – denotes risk transfer, RMP3 – denotes risk coping, RMP4 – denotes risk mitigation and transfer, RMP5 – denotes risk 
mitigation and coping and RMP7 – denotes risk transfer and coping. 
 
Table A4: Means and standard deviation of variables by risk management strategy (continued) 
 RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 RMP4 RMP5 RMP7 Total 
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Risk count 1.04 1.31 1.77 1.38 0.05 0.21 1.84 1.59 0.83 1.30 3.18 1.57 0.84 1.26 1.90 1.55 
Loss count 1.22 1.04 1.62 0.98 2.14 0.99 1.59 0.97 1.51 1.04 2.45 1.25 1.92 1.19 1.71 1.07 
Extension access 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.34 0.37 0.49 0.10 0.30 0.74 0.44 0.15 0.36 0.46 0.51 0.15 0.36 
Market information 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Road 3.76 0.91 3.58 0.88 4.18 0.45 3.67 0.81 3.87 0.78 3.40 0.92 3.78 0.92 3.59 0.88 
Market 3.93 0.46 3.98 0.45 4.13 0.44 3.93 0.43 4.00 0.60 3.94 0.46 3.89 0.71 3.96 0.45 
Membership 0.32 0.47 0.12 0.32 0.42 0.50 0.08 0.27 0.70 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.32 0.47 0.13 0.34 
Insurance needs 0.29 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.84 0.37 0.40 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.39 0.49 
Insurance knowledge 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.98 0.16 0.33 0.47 0.97 0.16 0.27 0.45 
Storage technology 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.37 0.07 0.26 0.20 0.40 0.01 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 
Support needs 0.70 0.46 0.75 0.43 0.95 0.21 0.72 0.45 0.95 0.22 0.80 0.40 0.92 0.28 0.75 0.43 
Type of support needs 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.74 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.77 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.78 0.42 0.51 0.50 
Mean land holding 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.13 
Mean fertilizer quantity 0.56 0.63 0.36 0.54 1.57 0.51 0.37 0.56 1.12 0.65 0.33 0.52 1.11 0.60 0.40 0.57 
Mean seed quantity 4.65 5.57 4.28 5.14 11.83 9.54 4.91 5.56 5.29 7.07 5.50 5.90 6.16 5.75 4.68 5.49 
Mean production cost 6591.5 20582.5 3115.3 13394.8 30254.6 29200.6 3110.6 7804.2 14762.6 18693.0 2514.7 5786.5 18259.2 56269.5 3736.3 13744.0 
Fertilizer use (kg/ha) 159.83 259.83 93.99 1816.04 393.92 289.27 49.63 115.8
8 
306.31 247.53 26.03 68.68 218.45 260.79 86.55 1396.48 
Seed use (kg/ha) 80.03 268.79 60.35 841.57 118.50 94.34 33.61 58.10 60.79 56.61 30.51 21.61 59.68 49.44 52.73 649.04 
Hired labour per ha 0.07 0.30 0.11 0.84 0.12 0.21 0.05 0.50 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.69 
Land productivity (kg/ha) 2257.5 4324.8 1197.7 15265.4 4609.0 3786.1 696.1 1150.0 3570.8 2886.5 627.8 1135.8 2358.6 2421.1 1155.1 11791.1 
Notes: RMP1 – denotes risk mitigation, RMP2 – denotes risk transfer, RMP3 – denotes risk coping, RMP4 – denotes risk mitigation and transfer, RMP5 – denotes risk 
mitigation and coping and RMP7 – denotes risk transfer and coping. 
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Table A5: Estimates of agriculture income equations 
 RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 RMP4 RMP5 RMP7 
Variable Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -0.005 0.007 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.034 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.144 -0.001 0.025 -0.046 0.046 
Gender 0.369 0.347 0.085 0.080 0.776 1.678 0.397* 0.220 0.352 2.501 0.104 0.593 -0.094 0.712 
Education -0.018 0.246 -0.045 0.036 0.679 1.009 -0.014 0.050 -0.100 5.602 -0.017 0.244 0.777 0.689 
HH size -0.011 0.033 -0.002 0.004 0.041 0.139 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.285 0.008 0.049 -0.074 0.087 
Total labour 0.024 0.047 0.010* 0.006 -0.008 0.225 0.006 0.013 -0.003 0.237 0.001 0.110 0.217 0.149 
Risk attitude 0.119 0.546 -0.031 0.119 0.952 2.338 0.143 0.146 0.127 6.576 0.036 0.549 1.610* 0.850 
Nature of work -0.036 0.495 -0.004 0.059 -0.031 0.997 0.040 0.090 -0.003 6.070 -0.040 0.827 -0.055 0.618 
Transfer 0.029 0.277 -0.016 0.067 0.030 1.176 0.034 0.083 0.175 2.332 0.039 1.974 -1.963*** 0.642 
Subsidy 0.092 0.177 0.056 0.074 -0.158 1.847 0.032 0.098 -0.006 5.311 0.033 0.583 2.333*** 0.834 
Credit access 0.108 0.547 0.023 0.078 0.506 0.996 0.157 0.114 0.100 2.593 -0.058 0.096 -1.026 0.800 
Irrigation 0.470 0.429 0.139* 0.079 0.229 1.574 -0.047 0.133 0.039 3.450 0.015 0.575 -0.454 0.814 
HWI -0.015 0.039 -0.007 0.014 0.162 0.435 -0.002 0.018 0.100 0.199 -0.024 0.189 0.057 0.275 
Land holding 0.006 0.114 -0.001 0.003 -0.032 0.195 0.004 0.019 -0.021 0.104 -0.002 0.072 0.371 0.187 
Crop portfolio 0.193 0.325 0.170*** 0.032 0.453 0.709 0.135*** 0.043 0.172 1.047 0.071 0.193 -1.295** 0.508 
Cash crop 0.370 1.010 0.123 0.169 -9.624 16.436 0.176 0.351 0.425 82.881 0.056 1.757 0.864 0.950 
SQI 1.082 1.082 -0.539 0.380 -0.288 4.842 -0.101 0.589 0.291 13.978 0.044 6.940 -8.439*** 0.710 
Rainfall 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
Temperature -0.025 0.063 0.008 0.011 -0.057 0.246 0.001 0.018 -0.030 0.522 0.022 0.084 0.245 0.323 
Risk count 0.031 0.141 -0.017 0.043 8.196 9.526 0.020 0.054 0.044 0.445 0.019 0.427 -0.526 0.431 
Loss count -0.041 0.240 0.015 0.037 -0.183 0.667 -0.027 0.055 -0.061 1.872 0.030 0.311 0.446 0.363 
Notes: RMP1 – denotes risk mitigation, RMP2 – denotes risk transfer, RMP3 – denotes risk coping, RMP4 – denotes risk mitigation and transfer, RMP5 – denotes risk 
mitigation and coping and RMP7 – denotes risk transfer and coping. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
 
Table A5: Estimates of agriculture income equations (continued) 
 RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 RMP4 RMP5 RMP7 
Variable Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Extension access -0.107 0.174 0.105* 0.053 0.244 1.059 0.151* 0.078 0.148 2.229 0.058 0.899 -2.965*** 0.770 
Market information -0.046 0.207 -0.004 0.028 -0.138 0.619 0.019 0.043 0.024 1.281 0.014 0.172 -0.146 0.690 
Road 0.091 0.116 -0.030 0.037 1.270 1.748 -0.010 0.050 0.230 0.676 -0.012 0.240 -0.668 0.551 
Market 0.091 0.305 0.124** 0.059 -0.507 1.530 -0.089 0.082 -0.151 1.017 0.085 0.614 1.149 0.718 
Mean land 0.771 5.438 0.932*** 0.227 -7.575 7.800 0.622 0.380 -0.367 106.591 1.097 2.022 0.339 0.361 
Mean fertilizer quantity 0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.008 -0.000 0.107 0.002 0.027 
Mean seed quantity 0.017 0.032 0.018*** 0.005 0.016 0.056 0.014** 0.005 0.009 0.052 0.007 0.199 -0.070 0.099 
Mean production cost 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Joint significance of 
crop varying covariates 0.47 48.55*** 1.00 8.09** 0.40 0.75 4.43 
rmp0 -0.030 0.565 -0.595 0.593 3.563 3.428 0.170 0.620 0.834 18.073 -0.759 2.636 -3.460*** 0.218 
rmp1 -0.248 1.483 -0.167 0.115 -5.790 4.067 -0.593 0.788 -0.909 20.639 -0.253 10.082 7.487*** 0.500 
rmp2 -0.916 1.275 -0.712* 0.382 -0.224 0.619 -0.647 0.451 -0.643 21.413 2.757 168689.300 2.860*** 0.601 
rmp3 0.896 4.315 -0.734 0.757 6.392 4.098 0.142 0.202 0.409 36.676 -0.311 2.623 -8.803*** 0.191 
rmp4 -0.799 1.416 -0.965*** 0.280 -1.886 2.031 0.000 0.416 0.089 0.601 -1.057 5.012 -9.857*** 0.636 
rmp5 0.017 1.860 -0.453 0.664 -5.573 8.084 0.116 0.697 0.530 38.106 -0.025 0.537 -0.630 0.487 
rmp7 -0.063 1.229 0.002 0.314 -0.168 2.866 -0.410 0.400 0.976 21.794 -0.985 13.397 0.330 0.498 
Constant 4.466** 1.985 3.715*** 0.612 0.301 15.657 4.270*** 1.168 4.863 9.970 3.363 8.111 -1.280 12.018 
Notes: RMP1 – denotes risk mitigation, RMP2 – denotes risk transfer, RMP3 – denotes risk coping, RMP4 – denotes risk mitigation and transfer, RMP5 – denotes risk 
mitigation and coping and RMP7 – denotes risk transfer and coping. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A5 
Table A6: Estimates of standard deviation of agriculture income equations 
 RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 RMP4 RMP5 RMP7 
Variable Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Age 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.025 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.013 
Gender -0.042 0.094 0.016 0.031 2.425 1.843 -0.063 0.116 0.033 0.265 -0.045 0.773 -0.471* 0.258 
Education -0.016 0.066 0.019 0.019 -0.370 0.915 -0.032 0.025 0.042 0.250 0.000 0.504 0.369* 0.219 
HH size 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.084 0.005* 0.003 -0.014 0.019 0.000 0.070 -0.023 0.027 
Risk attitude -0.016 0.136 -0.023 0.027 -1.267 1.638 0.017 0.054 0.138 0.358 -0.044 0.301 0.345 0.293 
Nature of work 0.140* 0.072 0.005 0.025 0.018 0.648 -0.014 0.059 0.126 0.247 0.015 0.764 -0.109 0.238 
Transfer 0.030 0.106 -0.018 0.031 0.397 0.931 -0.053 0.049 0.212 14.467 0.004 1.688 0.370 0.267 
Subsidy -0.140* 0.081 -0.024 0.028 0.064 1.487 -0.034 0.043 -0.208 0.265 0.008 0.717 0.313 0.313 
Credit access 0.219 0.181 -0.041 0.031 -0.402 0.677 -0.026 0.058 0.005 0.277 -0.011 0.054 0.098 0.262 
Irrigation -0.089 0.136 0.006 0.031 -0.057 1.110 -0.028 0.077 -0.142 0.383 -0.016 0.589 0.160 0.285 
HWI -0.024 0.020 0.012* 0.006 -0.062 0.225 0.002 0.009 -0.024 0.077 0.008 0.084 0.017 0.101 
Land holding 0.004 0.012 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.134 0.004 0.005 0.026 0.066 0.004 0.042 0.011 0.067 
Crop portfolio 0.009 0.059 -0.042*** 0.015 -0.156 0.449 -0.025 0.023 0.090 0.169 -0.042 0.142 -0.146 0.179 
Cash crop 0.028 0.290 -0.100 0.082 3.648 12.152 -0.177 0.165 -0.498 1.927 -0.028 2.583 0.952*** 0.329 
SQI 0.412 0.389 0.195* 0.108 -2.040 3.856 0.157 0.299 1.363 1.227 -0.013 4.241 -1.562*** 0.321 
Rainfall 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Risk count 0.047 0.074 0.008 0.017 -1.233 8.227 0.019 0.036 -0.115 0.230 -0.001 0.601 0.068 0.149 
Loss count 0.014 0.046 -0.008 0.014 0.077 0.534 0.011 0.024 -0.131 0.127 0.025 0.263 0.134 0.113 
Land productivity 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Extension access -0.046 0.071 -0.029 0.022 -0.106 0.611 -0.066* 0.040 -0.110 0.201 -0.060 0.383 0.079 0.279 
Market information 0.021 0.050 0.000 0.013 0.019 0.444 0.008 0.026 -0.022 0.170 0.012 0.497 -0.208 0.235 
Agriculture income share -0.093 16.707 0.029 0.966 -30.104** 12.534 0.066 0.739 -0.673 637.153 -0.175 3.402 -0.360 0.239 
Notes: RMP1 – denotes risk mitigation, RMP2 – denotes risk transfer, RMP3 – denotes risk coping, RMP4 – denotes risk mitigation and transfer, RMP5 – denotes risk 
mitigation and coping and RMP7 – denotes risk transfer and coping. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
Table A6: Estimates of standard deviation of agriculture income equations (continued) 
 RMP0 RMP1 RMP2 RMP3 RMP4 RMP5 RMP7 
Variable Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Nonfarm income -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Mean land -0.932 0.795 -0.044 0.152 1.568 10.008 -0.095 0.312 -0.277 12.050 -0.074 2.406 -1.241*** 0.186 
Mean fertilizer quantity -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.042 -0.001 0.009 
Mean seed quantity 0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.036 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.012 -0.005 0.268 0.011 0.034 
Mean production cost 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Joint significance of 
crop varying covariates 
χ2 (3) 1.41 2.7 0.04 2.65 0.16 0.0 45.58*** 
rmp0 -0.023 0.107 -0.041 0.166 -0.128 2.755 -0.097 0.305 -0.245 1.268 -0.382 6.889 -0.295** 0.143 
rmp1 -0.350 0.480 -0.081 0.070 1.680 3.597 0.059 0.391 0.018 1.187 -0.104 9.826 -1.288*** 0.282 
rmp2 -0.199 0.423 -0.314 0.222 -0.131 0.502 0.169 0.268 0.250 1.737 1.637 33272.350 -1.158*** 0.240 
rmp3 0.274 0.679 -0.009 0.165 -3.040 5.347 0.041 0.082 1.474 2.172 -0.370 4.963 -3.844*** 0.320 
rmp4 -0.137 0.315 -0.109 0.148 -0.351 1.678 0.329 0.268 -0.038 0.168 -0.119 3.606 -1.751*** 0.298 
rmp5 0.310 0.895 -0.029 0.212 2.698 10.849 0.204 0.349 -1.802 5.279 -0.057 1.632 -0.405 0.251 
rmp7 -0.085 0.496 -0.139 0.191 -0.752 2.682 -0.068 0.238 -0.338 1.053 0.246 33.698 0.036 0.147 
Constant 0.173 16.720 0.282 0.968 30.447** 13.160 0.271 0.839 0.838 637.084 0.354 9.904 -2.457** 1.196 
Notes: RMP1 – denotes risk mitigation, RMP2 – denotes risk transfer, RMP3 – denotes risk coping, RMP4 – denotes risk mitigation and transfer, RMP5 – denotes risk 
mitigation and coping and RMP7 – denotes risk transfer and coping. ***, ** represent 1%, and 5% significance level, respectively. Reported standard errors are the bootstrapped 
standard errors. 
 
 
Appendix A6 
Soil Quality Index (SQI) Calculations 
In computing the soil quality index for the study, we used the “Soil nutrient maps of Sub-
Saharan Africa19” raster file at 250 m resolution provided by the International Soil Reference 
and Information Centre (ISRIC). Nutrients covered in this data include; total nitrogen (N), total 
phosphorus (P), extractable phosphorus (P), potassium (K), calcium (Ca), magnesium (Mg), 
sodium (Na), aluminium (Al), boron (B), copper (Cu), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn) and zinc 
(Zn) in (ppm). For the estimation approaches for the nutrients data, curious readers are referred 
to Hengl et al., (2017). Additionally, we used soil physical and biochemical properties data20 
provided by ISRIC for the computation of the index. We also used free spatial data from DIVA-
GIS21 in the form of shapefiles for administrative regions of our study country.  Using the free 
and open source geographic information system, software called QGIS (previously known as 
Quantum GIS) and the geographic coordinate data of farm households, we calculate the soil 
parameters for each farm household. The Soil  Quality Index (SQI) was calculated following 
the approaches described in Zheng et al., (2005); Mukherjee and Lal (2014); and Zhang et al., 
(2015). First, we used principal component analysis (PCA) to identify a minimum data set 
(MDS) to reduce the indicator load in the estimation of the index and avoid data redundancy. 
During the principal component analysis, only the ‘highly weighted’ variables were retained in 
the MDS. After selection of parameters for the MDS, all selected observations were 
transformed using linear scoring functions (less is better, more is better and optimum) based 
on the recommendations in the empirical literature (Amacher et al., 2007; Mukherjee and Lal, 
2014). Thereafter, the weighted additive SQI was computed using the formula below: 
SQI = Σ Weight * Individual oil parameter score  
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